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This dissertation consists of three essays. The first one brings together
the areas of public and labor economics by developing a hypothesis that relates
optimal taxation and time use. Using Mexican data on household time use
and consumption, we find significant substitution between goods and time in
home production and different elasticities of substitution for different house-
hold commodities. Adding these findings to the optimal tax problem, we show
it is optimal to impose higher taxes on market goods used in the production of
commodities with a lower elasticity of substitution between goods and time.
This is an analog of the classical Corlett and Hague (1953) result, differing in
that we allow for the possibility of substitution between goods and time in the
production of commodities.
The second chapter is about international migration, in the area of
labor economics. On one hand, surveillance of the border between Mexico
vi
and the United States by the U.S. government has increased dramatically over
the last two decades. On the other hand, undocumented Mexican migrants
often make multiple trips between the two countries. Thus, my hypothesis
is that these migrants respond to heightened surveillance by increasing the
length of stay of the current trip. I estimate a semi-parametric hazard model
following Meyer (1990). Using data from the Mexican Migration Project I find
no evidence that border enforcement affects the hazard of leaving the U.S. by
undocumented Mexican Immigrants.
The last essay is about mother’s time and children related expenditures.
Using data from the Mexican Time Use Survey and the National Household
Survey of Income and Expenditure from 2002, I examine the time Mexican
mothers dedicate to taking care of their children and the amount of money
spent by the household in raising children. The main contribution of this
paper is that it analyzes child care time use and child care expenditures simul-
taneously. The age of the youngest child is the most important determinant
of both child care time and money expenditures. It is the case that more edu-
cated mothers spend more money on their children. With respect to child care
time use, more educated mothers spend more or less time with their children
depending on whether they are working or non-working mothers. At all levels
of non-mother’s income, working mothers spend significantly more money rela-
tive to time in child care than non-working mothers. For both groups the ratio
of money over time increases at a decreasing rate; however, for non-working
mothers the income expansion path is much flatter.
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Chapter 1
The Optimal Tax Rule in the Presence of
Time Use
1.1 Introduction1
Following Becker (1965), we assume that individuals combine market
goods and time to produce commodities which ultimately yield utility. For
example, consider a household that wants to change their car’s engine oil.
In order to get this commodity, the household needs to combine both market
goods and time. Having only the engine oil does not give any utility, it has to be
put in the car’s engine, which requires time. Then we allow for the possibility
of substitution between market goods and time to produce commodities. In the
case of changing the car’s engine oil, one way to get the commodity is to stop by
Firestone and pay someone to do the job. This solution saves the household’s
time but requires payment, including taxes, for the service. Alternatively,
members of the household can perform the maintenance themselves. This
solution can save money and avoid taxation, but requires more time, assuming
the professional working at Firestone has an absolute advantage in production,
which is likely true in most cases. Take another example given by Burda
1This chapter was written in collaboration with Jean Lim.
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et al. (2008). An American couple has to choose between goods-intensive
and time-intensive summer vacations facing a limited budget constraint. The
goods-intensive solution is to spend their time flying to the Coˆte d’Azur for a
one-week holiday. On the other hand, the time-intensive solution is to take a
two-week caravan trip to the Great Smoky Mountains National Park.
How do taxes on market goods affect the household’s decision of how
many market goods and how much time to use in home production? These
two examples show that taxes on market goods can affect the choice of the
household between goods-intensive and time-intensive solutions. Specially, an
increase in taxes on market goods encourages households to substitute away
from the market goods input in favor of the untaxed non-market time input.
Therefore, if the government decides to change the tax rate on a specific market
good, the government has to take the possibility of substitution into account.
In this paper, we first state theoretically how taxes on market good re-
late to the elasticities of substitution assuming that each commodity produc-
tion function has a constant elasticity of substitution functional form, and solve
the optimal commodity tax problem for the benevolent government. Within
the framework of a three-commodity economy proposed by Corlett and Hague
(1953-1954) and the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas utility function, we find
that the optimal tax rule is to impose a higher tax rate on market goods
used in the production of commodities with a lower elasticity of substitution
between goods and time.
Then we check how this optimal tax rule compares to what we see in
2
reality. To this purpose, we need to calculate the elasticities of substitution be-
tween market goods and time for different commodities. We use the Mexican
time use data which is the only data set for which we observe disaggregated
market good expenditures and time uses for the same household and for vari-
ous different commodities. We find that ‘Eating’ has the lowest elasticity of
substitution and ‘Recreation’ has the highest elasticity of substitution. Ac-
cording to our theory, these results imply that ‘Eating’ should be taxed at a
very high rate and ‘Recreation’ at a very low rate. The optimal value added
tax system for Mexico would impose 7.0% tax rate on food and 5.5% on market
goods used in the production of ‘Lodging, Appearance, and Recreation’. This
optimal tax structure is more regressive compared to the actual Mexican tax
system in which the government gives more weight to equity considerations
than to economic efficiency.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a theoretical
model of the optimal taxation problem. Section 1.3 describes our data set
and summarizes key variables. The econometric framework and estimation
results are presented in section 1.4. Section 1.5 provides policy implications,
and section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Theoretical Model
1.2.1 Background
Since Becker’s (1965) pioneering idea of household production as a com-
bination of goods and time, a substantial amount of theoretical and empiri-
3
cal work on the household production has been done in a variety of areas
in economics (Hamermesh (2007)). However, relatively little work has been
conducted in public finance (see, e.g., Zhang et al. (2008)). The exception is
the topic of optimal tax theory and the relevant literature includes Sandmo
(1990), Gahvari and Yang (1993), Kleven (2000, 2004), and Boadway and
Gahvari (2006).
Sandmo (1990) introduced the home production approach into the op-
timal taxation problem and found that the income tax creates distortions,
giving an incentive to use too much time in home production. However, even
though time spent preparing meals may be qualitatively different from time
spent listening to music, Sandmo (1990) did not deal with the possibility that
different household activities can give different utilities. Gahvari and Yang
(1993) first related optimal commodity taxes to the Becker’s (1965) idea of
home production. They assumed that households consume a bundle of goods,
each of which requires time in fixed, but different, proportions to yield utility.
Then they found that optimal commodity tax rates depend on time spent con-
suming each good. Using the same formulation as Gahvari and Yang (1993),
Kleven (2004) proposed that the optimal commodity taxation is governed by
factor shares in household activities. That is, any market good which requires
little time should carry a relatively low tax rate. Boadway and Gahvari (2006)
studied the optimal commodity taxation problem under two assumptions: that
consumption time is either a perfect substitute for labor or a perfect substi-
tute for leisure and that time spent consuming any particular good is taken
4
to be a fixed proportion of the quantity of the good. They showed that while
labor substitutability affects the optimal tax structure, leisure substitutability
leaves the classical optimal tax results intact.
Although these studies that have followed the original contribution of
Gahvari and Yang (1993) give us useful insights into what the optimal com-
modity tax system looks like when households combine goods and time to
produce commodities, they rule out the possibility of substitution between
goods purchases and time use in the production of commodity. Both studies
make use of a Leontief home production function, assuming that the amount
of time devoted to the consumption of goods is fixed. Introducing a Leontief
home production function has a great advantage, it simplifies the optimal com-
modity taxation problem by reducing it to the classical optimal commodity
tax problem without home production. Allowing the possibility of substitution
between market goods and time use complicates the problem.2
It is true that the assumption of a Leontief home production function
does not completely rule out the possibility of substitution in household pro-
duction. Kleven (2004) takes dish-washing as an example. Dish-washing may
be carried out by the use of a brush or a machine and these two production
processes involve fixed, but different ratios between market goods and time.
So Kleven (2004) argues that washing up with a brush or a machine are two
2Under the Leontief production function (Zj = min
(
Xj
aj
, Tj
)
where Xj and Tj represent
market goods and time use, respectively), the optimal commodity taxation problem becomes
the classical optimal tax problem without home production, that is, U (Z0, Z1, ..., Zn) =
U (X0/a0, X1/a1, X2/a2, ..., Xn/an).
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different commodities. Nevertheless, the problem is that the assumption of
Leontief home production function requires too many commodities since there
are numerous ways to wash dishes other than using a brush and a machine. For
example, you can hire a maid. In contrast, if we explicitly allow the possibility
of substitution between goods input and time input in home production, we
can think of dish-washing as a composite commodity incorporating many dif-
ferent combinations of goods and time. So the aggregation of commodities can
reduce the number of tax rates. This reduction is important in practical point
of view, since it is impossible in real world to implement the Leontief-based
optimal tax system; many different commodities should be taxed at different
rates. As Belan et al. (2008) pointed out, the grouping of commodities should
be done when there is a constraint on the number of tax rates.
Kleven (2000) provided a more general approach than Kleven (2004).
Kleven (2000) showed that the optimal tax is related to factor shares and elas-
ticities of substitution. However, the relationship is not clear without specific
functional forms of home production, since household will optimally change
factor shares in response to the change in tax rate. The relationship between
the optimal tax and elasticities of substitution in household production varies
depending on the functional forms of home production. While Kleven (2004)
circumvents this problem by assuming Leontief production function,3 we use a
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function that has better advantages
3In case of Leontief production function factor shares do not change in respond to the
change in tax rates. Factor shares are determined by parameters of the Leontief production
function.
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over Leontief function.
Our contribution is to allow explicitly the possibility of substitution
between goods and time in home production by assuming a CES production
function. In the theory section, we emphasize the importance of elasticity of
substitution between goods and time uses in designing optimal tax system and
derive the optimal tax rule under this possibility. The empirical analysis is
based on Gronau and Hamermesh’s (2006) commodity classifications and we
estimate the elasticity of substitution between market goods and time for each
commodity. From an optimal tax perspective, the magnitude of elasticity of
substitution is important. So we test the hypothesis that these elasticities are
equal and derive the corresponding policy implications. This new example
shows that the restrictive Leontief assumption can be relaxed to allow for
estimation of elasticities that are directly useful for policy.
1.2.2 Household Maximization Problem
1.2.2.1 Utility Maximization
Households combine market goods and time to produce commodities
that directly enter their utility function. Assume that qj = pj + sj where qj
is the consumer price of market good Xj, pj is the producer price of Xj, and
sj is the tax on Xj. We also assume that w and T represent the wage rate
and total time available, respectively, and M is non-labor income. Then we
can write the household utility maximization problem in the following way. If
there are n + 1 commodities and we take q1, q2, ..., qn, w, T , and M as given,
7
then the household’s problem is:
max
{Xj}nj=1,{Tj}nj=0
U (Z0, Z1, ..., Zn) such that
n∑
j=1
qjXj = w
(
T −
n∑
j=0
Tj
)
+M
where Zj =
 T0 if j = 0(Xθjj + T θjj ) 1θj if j = 1...n, and θj < 1.
Z0 is pure leisure that does not need market goods, but needs time. However,
other commodities Zj 6=0 are produced with both goods Xj and time Tj and
with specific technology having constant elasticity of substitution between Xj
and Tj. Let σ be the elasticity of substitution between market goods and
time. So σ is equal to 1
1−θ . This optimization problem is not easy to solve, so
we circumvent the difficulty with two steps. At the first stage, the household
determines the optimal amount of goods and time input for each commodity
by solving the cost minimization problem for given Z¯j. Then, in the second
stage, the household makes a decision on the amount of consumption of each
commodity.
First Step Note that the price of Xj is qj (= pj + sj) and the price of Tj is
w. The household cost minimization problem is the following. Given Z¯j, qj,
and w,
min
Xj ,Tj
qjXj + wTj such that Z¯j =
(
X
θj
j + T
θj
j
) 1
θj .
Taking first order conditions yields:(
Xj
Tj
)
=
(
w
qj
) 1
1−θj
. (1.1)
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To measure how goods and time are combined to produce a commodity let the
goods intensity of commodity j be Xj/Tj. Then equation (1.1) tells us how
the goods intensity is related to w, q, and θ. Taking the derivative of Xj/Tj
with respect to w and sj we know that:
∂
∂w
(
Xj
Tj
)
> 0
∂
∂sj
(
Xj
Tj
)
< 0
∂2
∂w∂sj
(
Xj
Tj
)
< 0.
First, an increase in the wage, w, raises the goods intensity. This suggests that
the goods intensity is increasing in household income,4 which is consistent
with empirical evidence.5 Hamermesh (2007) calculates the goods intensity
of eating at various percentiles of the income distribution for 1985 and 2003
and shows that the goods intensity increases when you move to the upper
end of the income distribution.6 Second, the increase in tax sj reduces the
goods intensity, but the magnitude of the effect depends on w. The effect
becomes larger as wage decreases, which means that lower-income households
are likely to be more sensitive to the tax change. Third, the goods intensity
of commodity j depends on w, qj, and θj, but does not depend on taxes on
other goods sj 6=k.
The solution to the cost minimization problem is:
X∗j = αjZ¯j, T
∗
j = βjZ¯j (1.2)
4This is true as long as wage is a proxy for household income.
5It might be interesting to compare goods intensities across countries. We expect that
the goods intensity will be higher in countries with a higher real wage (w/q).
6See Table 5 in Hamermesh (2007).
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where αj ≡
(
1 +
(qj
w
)− θj
θj−1
)− 1
θj
and βj ≡
(
1 +
(qj
w
) θj
θj−1
)− 1
θj
.
This result looks like the assumption of Kleven (2004). However, the difference
is that coefficients αj and βj depend on the tax rate sj. Kleven (2004) assumes
that these coefficients are fixed regardless of the tax rate sj. Our result shows
that when government increases the tax rate sj on good Xj, households opti-
mally respond by using less of the good and more time in the production of
commodity Z¯j.
Second Step This step solves the utility maximization problem of the house-
hold. Given qj for j = 1, ..., n, w, and the solution from the first step, the
problem becomes:
max
Z0,Z1,··· ,Zn
U (Z0, Z1, · · · , Zn) such that
n∑
j=1
qjXj = w
(
T −
n∑
j=0
Tj
)
+M.
By using (1.2), we can rewrite the budget constraint as:
n∑
j=0
γjZj = wT +M
where γj =
{
w if j = 0
qjαj + wβj if j = 1, ..., n.
This relation tells us that the price of Zj is γj which is the weighted sum of
the price of good Xj, qj, and the price of time, w. The price of Z0 is only w
since it does not require market goods for its production. From the first order
conditions, we obtain Uj = λγj for j = 0, 1, ..., n.
10
1.2.3 Optimal Government Policy
The benevolent government’s optimal tax problem is to choose s1,...,sn
to maximize the indirect utility of the representative household subject to
the requirement that taxes yield an exogeneous amount of revenue R¯. If the
government changes the tax rate on market goods, the household responds
by changing both market purchases and time use. The social planner has to
consider the effect of the tax change on both goods and time spent by the
household. The government problem is:
max
s1,...,sn
V (q1, .., qn, w) such that
n∑
j=1
sjXj = R¯
where qj = pj + sj for j = 1, ..., n.
The first-order conditions are:
∂V
∂qk
+ µ
(
Xk +
n∑
j=1
sj
∂Xj
∂qk
)
= 0 for k = 1, .., n.
By the envelope theorem, we can rewrite first order conditions as follows:
λ− µ
µ
=
n∑
j=1
sj
Xk
∂Xj
∂qk
.
Then, using the Slutsky equation and Slutsky symmetry,7 we can rewrite these
conditions as:
λ− µ
µ
+
n∑
j=1
sj
∂Xj
∂M
=
n∑
j=1
sj
qj
εckj, (1.3)
7For detailed derivations of these equations, please refer to the Appendix A.1.
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where εckj ≡ qjXk
∂Xck
∂qj
is the compensated elasticity of Xk with respect to the
change in the price of Xj. Note that the left hand side of equation (1.3) does
not depend on k 6= j. Therefore it is constant. Let −Φ ≡ λ−µ
µ
+
∑n
j=1 sj
∂Xj
∂M
.
Then we can derive the Ramsey Rule as follows:
−Φ =
n∑
j=1
sj
qj
εckj for k =1,...,n. (1.4)
This Ramsey rule has the standard form of the optimal commodity tax ex-
pression which emphasizes the importance of compensated price responses.
(Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), Sandmo (1987), Sandmo (1990)).8
Three-commodity Economy
Next, we examine a three-commodity economy first proposed by Corlett
and Hague (1953-1954), and then used by Kleven (2004) and Boadway and
Gahvari (2006). In this case, there are one untaxable commodity (Z0) and two
taxable commodities (Z1, Z2) with different elasticities of substitution between
goods and time. The Ramsey rule in the elasticity form becomes:
−Φ = s1
q1
εc11 +
s2
q2
εc12 and
−Φ = s1
q1
εc21 +
s2
q2
εc22.
8A detailed explanation of the Ramsey rule can be found in Diamond and Mirrlees (1971,
p.262) and Sandmo (1990, p.92).
12
If we use the homogeneity property of compensated demand functions,9 we
can solve for the tax rates as:( s1
q1
s2
q2
)
= −Φ
Π
(
εc11 + ε
c
22 + 3ε
c
10
εc11 + ε
c
22 + 3ε
c
20
)
where Π ≡ εc11εc22 − εc21εc12. This result suggests that if the compensated elas-
ticity of X1 with respect to the price of leisure is lower than the compensated
elasticity of X2 with respect to the price of leisure then a higher tax should be
imposed on X1. Symbolically, ε
c
10 < ε
c
20 → s1/q1 > s2/q2.10 This result is the
analog of standard Corlett-Hague rule: the highest tax rate ought to be levied
on the commodity with the highest degree of complementarity with leisure.
This result, however, differs from the standard Corlett-Hague rule, because of
the last term on the right-hand side of each equation. In case of the standard
Corlett-Hague rule, the last term on the right-hand side of the equation is εc10,
not 3εc10. This difference can be easily understood from the fact that the price
of time is the same whether the time is used for the production of Z0, Z1, or
Z2.
Ramsey rule is hard to apply in practice because little is known about
the magnitudes of the compensated elasticities (Kleven (2004)). However, the
elasticities of substitution can be estimated easily. This is why we study the
9For the detailed derivation of the property of compensated elasticity, please refer to the
Appendix A.2.
10Diamond and Mirrlees (1971, p.262) prove that Φ is positive. Π is also positive, which
can be proved using the determinant of the matrix of substitution effects (Sandmo (1987,
p.93)).
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relationship between the compensated elasticity and the elasticity of substi-
tution between goods and time. To do this, we assume a specific functional
form for the utility function. Specifically, we assume the following log utility
function:
u (Z0, Z1, Z2) = δ0 lnZ0 + δ1 lnZ1 + δ2 lnZ2 (1.5)
where Zj =
 T0 if j = 0(Xθjj + T θjj ) 1θj if j = 1, 2 and θ1 < θ2 < 1,
and δ0 + δ1 + δ2 = 1.
Conventional wisdom contends that the price of a necessity is lower than the
price of a luxury. If this is the case, we can show that the smaller the elasticity
of substitution between goods and time, the smaller the compensated elasticity
in a three-commodity economy with the logarithmic preferences stipulated by
equation (5).11 Symbolically, σ1 < σ2 → εc10 < εc20. Even in case that the price
of a necessity is higher than the price of a luxury, if a necessity tends to have
a lower elasticity of substitution than a luxury which is shown empirically
in Section 1.4, the smaller the elasticity of substitution between goods and
time, the smaller the compensated elasticity. This relationship has a quite
important implication. The elasticity of substitution between goods and time
is determined by the technology of home production, but the compensated
elasticity represents the market. So the relationship shows us how the home
production technology is related to the market response. In response to the
11For the detailed derivations, please refer to the technical Appendix A.2.
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change in the wage rate, goods with higher elasticity of substitution between
goods and time have larger compensated elasticity.
Proposition In a three-commodity economy with logarithmic preferences, the
optimal tax policy requires that a higher tax should be placed on goods with a
lower elasticity of substitution between goods and time. Symbolically, σ1 < σ2
→ s1/q1 > s2/q2.
1.3 Data
To demonstrate the applicability of these results we use the National
Time Use Survey 200212 (ENUT) from Mexico. This is a nationally representa-
tive sample including urban and rural communities. It surveys all individuals13
who were aged 12 years or older at the time of the survey. The total sample
includes 4,783 households and 20,342 individuals. The objective of the sur-
vey is to measure the activities undertaken by men and women within the
household.
One disadvantage of the ENUT data set is that the questionnaire is not
based on time use diaries where individuals are asked to report the activities
undertaken on a given day. Instead, individuals are only asked to report how
many hours in the week were spent doing a finite number of activities listed
12Encuesta Nacional del Uso del Tiempo 2002, http://www.inegi.gob.mx.
13By all individuals we mean residents and non-residents. The latter group includes
personnel who help with household activities and individuals staying there temporarily.
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in the questionnaire. Hence, the total time use for each individual does not
add up to 168 hours, the total number of hours in a week. In fact, total
time use averages 163.15 hours for our analysis sample. Although it is well
known that diary time use questionnaires are more detailed and more reliable
for research, the majority of time use surveys, including ENUT, instead use
recall questionnaires for major activities due to the cost and complexity of the
survey design.
This disadvantage is compensated by a very important advantage. The
ENUT is a sub-sample of the National Household Survey of Income and Ex-
penditure 200214 (ENIGH), the Mexican national income and expenditure data
set. Therefore, we can match the time use data with the expenditure data by
household. To our knowledge, only Mexican data provides information (for
the same household) on both time uses and goods expenditures for a large
number of commodities, although statistical agencies in a number of countries
are moving to generate combined time use and expenditure files.
1.3.1 Definitions of Commodities
A household engages in numerous activities every day, for example, hav-
ing breakfast and dinner, or taking a shower and watching television. All these
activities need both market goods and time as inputs. To simplify the analysis
we implicitly allocate activities into ten mutually exclusive categories, which
are called commodities. The commodities are ‘Sleep’, ‘Eating’, ‘Lodging’, ‘Ap-
14Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto de los Hogares 2002, http://www.inegi.gob.mx.
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pearance’, ‘Recreation’, ‘Health’, ‘Child-care’, ‘Travel’, ‘Miscellaneous’ and
‘Work’. Classification of time uses and goods expenditures is not straightfor-
ward because any classification is somewhat arbitrary. In order to be consistent
with previous literature and to avoid as much subjectivity on our part, we use
Gronau and Hamermesh’s (2006) definition of commodities. Tables 1.1 and
1.2 define the time use and goods expenditure categories, respectively. In both
tables we exhaust all reported time uses and expenditures from the data.
Table 1.1: Time Use Categoriesa
Commodity Category
Sleep Night sleep and .5(rest or recovery from an illness).
Eating Eating at home and away, meal preparation,
clean-up, grocery shopping, raising corral animals,
collecting fruits, hunting, fishing, and taking care of orchard.
Lodging House cleaning, outdoor chores, home and car repairs,
gardening and animal care, durable goods shopping, misc. household duties,
and, .5(make furniture, ornament or traditional craft for the house).
Appearance Laundry and clothes care, personal and beauty care, and personal hygiene.
Recreation Sex, nonreligious organizations, entertainment, culture,
visits, social events, sports, hobbies, crafts, games, reading, writing,TV and radio,
conversing, thinking, .5(make furniture, ornament or traditional craft),
and non-travel educational activities if no children and individual is aged > 59.
Health .5(Rest or recovery from illness), taking care of a
family member that is temporarily ill, and personal health care.
Child-care All infant and child-care non-travel activities if children.
Travel Accompany any member of the family to somewhere, take or pick up
any member of the family to somewhere and travel to education-related
activities if no children.
Miscellaneous Taking care of family documents, helping other households
voluntarily, taking care of other members of the family with a physical or
mental limitation, volunteering, religious activities, making payments,
personal proceedings, taking food to another member of the family to school
or work, attending funeral services, non-travel education-related activities
if no children and individual is aged <60, and all infant and child-care
non-travel activities if no children.
Work Working at a paid job, job search time, and work commuting time.
a We exhaust all time uses reported in the ENUT 2002 into these ten mutually exclusive
categories which we called commodities. Note that ‘Health’ does not include medical
care at hospitals. Also, ‘Travel’ does not include all non-working travel time.
The classifications are not exactly the same as in Gronau and Hamer-
mesh (2006). There are three minor variations in the time use categories
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Table 1.2: Goods Expenditure Categoriesa
Commodity Category
Sleep None
Eating Food+.5(beverages)+.33(appliances).
Lodging Housing+.33(appliances)+.5(communications)+
materials and services to repair, maintain or extend the house.
Appearance Apparel and services+.33(appliances)+personal care.
Recreation Entertainment+tobacco+.5(beverages)+.5(communications)+
education expenses if no children and individual is aged > 60.
Health If no children: Hospital care, doctor care, medicine
expenses without prescription.
If children: Health*(1-number of children/size of the family)
Child-care boys’ and girls’ apparel+ education+
Health*(number of children/size of the family) if children.
Travel Private and public transportation prorated by nonwork
travel divided by total travel time.
Miscellaneous Other expenditures and transfers+education expenses
if no children and individual is aged < 60+boys’ and girls’ apparel
if no children.
Work None
a We exhaust all goods expenditures reported in the ENIGH 2002 into these ten
mutually exclusive categories which we called commodities. We assume that ‘Sleep’
have no goods expenditures related to it. Any expenditures seemingly related to
‘Sleep’ were included either in ‘Lodging’ or ‘Appearance’ .
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due to differences in the questionnaire structure between their data sets and
ours. In our case, time use for ‘Eating’ includes not only eating at home and
away, meal preparation, clean-up, and grocery shopping, but also raising cor-
ral animals, collecting fruits, hunting, fishing, and taking care of the orchard.
Also, in our classification, ‘Health’ does not include medical care at hospitals.
Given the available data, ‘Health’ only includes time spent recovering from
an illness, taking care of a family member that is temporarily ill, and personal
health care. Finally, the other difference is in the ‘Travel’ time use category.
In our data set, this only includes time spent accompanying a member of the
family to go somewhere and taking or picking up any member of the family
to go somewhere, so it does not includes all non-working travel time. With
respect to goods expenditures categories, there are essentially no differences
between our classification and that in Gronau and Hamermesh (2006). The
only minor discrepancy is that ‘Lodging’ includes materials and services to re-
pair, maintain, or extend the dwelling besides housing, a fraction of appliances
expenditures, and a fraction of communication expenditures. In both classifi-
cations, ‘Sleep’ and ‘Work’ are assumed to have no expenditures related to
them.
1.3.2 Households
The unit of analysis is the household, not individuals, because in the
ENIGH only household expenditures are reported. In the sample we only
include nuclear households (only one family within the dwelling) to keep the
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sample as homogeneous as possible, because different types of families have
different time use patterns.15 For instance, we expect married couples to be
more efficient in home production than single individuals due to specialization
by husband and wife in certain activities. In fact, single men spend on average
16 hours on the ‘Eating’, while husbands spend on average 12 hours per week
on the same commodity. On the other hand, wives spend on average 34 hours
per week on ‘Eating’, whereas single women spend only 22 hours. In the case
of extended families (more than one family within the dwelling) it is easy
to imagine that these families are different from nuclear families in terms of
household expenditures and time uses. It could be the case that families within
the extended household do not pool their incomes. Even in those cases, it is
possible that such families share time uses. For example, a member of one
of the families takes care of all the children within the dwelling, making all
other members of the extended household more efficient in their allocation of
time. Because of these differences we eliminated 1,286 households from the
sample. In addition, 500 observations were dropped because only one spouse
was present at the time of the survey. Finally, 57 households were removed
because they had no income or were missing other variables. The total number
of households in our sample is 2,940.
In Table 1.3, we summarize the demographic characteristics of husbands
and wives as well as their time uses. In this table and throughout the paper,
15Nuclear households represents 70% of the sample. The other 30% is composed of one-
person households (7%) and extended households (23%).
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we define earnings as all labor earnings, specifically, salaries, wages, overtime
payments, and self-employment income.
Table 1.3: Demographic Characteristics and Time Uses of Husbands
and Wivesb
Husbands Wives
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Age 42.70 13.66 39.11 12.91
Years of Schooling 6.73 4.92 6.31 4.37
Labor Force Participation .907 .290 .388 .487
Earningsa 928.14 1249.96 207.47 578.21
Firm sizec 50.46 303.09 7.55 66.34
Unionized workerd .074 .262 .028 .165
Time Usese (hrs/week)
Sleep 56.04 16.40 57.81 11.38
Eating 11.68 9.74 33.63 15.78
Lodging 4.15 6.01 16.41 10.18
Appearance 4.36 3.07 13.85 6.95
Health 3.34 5.69 2.77 5.09
Recreation 16.98 14.19 16.04 13.26
Child-care 1.59 6.21 6.32 18.00
Miscellaneous 4.64 9.47 12.90 22.78
Travel .42 1.67 .94 2.30
Work 50.10 24.29 12.14 21.28
a In Mexican pesos as of 2002, per week. We define earnings as all labor earnings,
specifically, salaries, wages, overtime payments, and self-employment income.
b Number of observations: 2,940.
c Firm size refers to the number of workers in the firm where the husband or the
wife works.
d Unionized worker is a indicator variable equal to one if the firm is unionized
and zero otherwise.
e The use of time for each individual does not add up to 168 hours, the to-
tal number of hours in a week, because the ENUT 2002 is based on recall
questionnaires on major activities and not on time use diaries.
Based on the summary statistics in Table 1.3, we know that husbands
are on average 4 years older than wives in the sample. In terms of years of
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schooling, both spouses are very similar, averaging about 7 years of education.
It is also worth noting that wives’ earnings are significantly lower than their
husbands. This is directly related to the labor force participation decision of
both husbands and wives. A total of 91 percent of husbands participate in the
labor force, whereas only 39 percent of wives do.
Husbands and wives have different time use patterns as a result of
specialization. Husbands report 50 hours of work on average, while wives only
work, on average, 12 hours a week in a paid job. However, wives dedicate 34
hours of the week, on average, to ‘Eating’ and 16 hours to ‘Lodging’, while
men spend only 12 and 4 hours, respectively. Also wives dedicate more time to
‘Appearance’, ‘Child-care’ and ‘Miscellaneous’ commodities than husbands.
With respect to ‘Sleep’ and ‘Recreation’, both husbands and wives devote
similar amounts of time, around 56 and 16 hours a week, respectively.
1.3.3 Time Use and Goods Expenditure
1.3.3.1 Time Use
In Table 1.4, we summarize both expenditures and time use of the
household.16 We define household time use as the sum of the husband’s and
wife’s time use. The household allocates 62 hours for ‘Work’ a week, on
average. A total of 45 hours a week are devoted to ‘Eating’ and 21 hours are
16For the time use variables the week of reference was the week from Monday to Sunday
before the day of the survey. For the non-time variables the unit of time was daily, monthly,
quarterly, or every six months depending on the type of expenditure. All variables were
converted into a weekly basis.
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used on ‘Lodging’. The household sleeps an average of 114 hours a week and
33 hours are used for ‘Recreation’per week. Notice that average time spent on
‘Travel’ is about 2 hours per week. This reflects that the measure we have for
‘Travel’ time use is poor. The household allocates only 8 hours per week to
‘Child-care’, on average.17
Table 1.4: Summary Statistics of the Householdsc
Expendituresa Time Useb
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Sleep – – 113.85 22.96
Eating 389.77 321.10 45.31 20.86
Lodging 204.18 270.70 20.56 11.99
Appearance 156.89 187.47 18.21 7.95
Health 36.09 157.79 6.11 9.35
Recreation 104.22 201.23 33.02 23.70
Child-care 124.26 348.85 7.91 22.02
Miscellaneous 62.26 254.83 17.54 29.24
Travel 5.45 54.82 1.36 3.25
Work – – 62.24 33.17
a In Mexican pesos as of 2002, per week.
b The time use of the household is defined as the sum of the time
use of the husband and the wife, per week.
c Number of observations: 2,940.
In principle we could also add the time use of other members of the
family to the household time use. However, most of the other members are
children whose opportunity cost of time is not determined by the labor mar-
ket. In fact, we could argue that there is no opportunity cost for their time.
Nonetheless, in an attempt to capture any effect children could have on the
17Around 40% of households do not have children.
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allocation of goods or time in the household production of commodities, we
control for the number of children in our estimation.
1.3.3.2 Market Goods Expenditure
Household expenditures are summarized in Table 1.4. ‘Sleep’ is as-
sumed to have no expenditures related to it. Although almost negligible, any
expenditures seemingly related to ‘Sleep’ were included either in ‘Lodging’ or
‘Appearance’. On average, families in this sample spent 400 pesos per week on
‘Eating’, 200 pesos per week on ‘Lodging’, 150 pesos per week on ‘Appearance’
and 124 pesos per week on ‘Child-care’. These four categories comprise the
four largest components of the household total expenditures.
Households can hire workers such as maids, nannies, or drivers to pro-
duce household commodities. The employees carry out activities that are
included in ‘Eating’, ‘Lodging’, ‘Appearance’, ‘Travel’ or ‘Child-care’ com-
modities. Therefore, we include the monetary payments the workers receive
as household good expenditures because they represent market goods used to
produce household commodities. However, we do not observe the salary these
employees actually receive for their services, so we use the hourly minimum
wage18 to construct the market value of their hours of work. For example,
if the employee dedicated 10 hours a week to the production of the ‘eating’
commodity and 25 hours to the ‘Lodging’ commodity then we include 10*min-
imum wage in the ‘Eating’ expenditure category and 25*minimum wage in
18The average minimum wage in Mexico for 2002 was 4.96 pesos per hour.
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the ‘Lodging’ expenditure category.
1.4 Estimation
We only estimate the elasticity of substitution for the ‘Eating’, ‘Lodg-
ing’, ‘Appearance’, and ‘Recreation’ commodities. ‘Health’ and ‘Travel’ are
not included in the estimation because, as explained in Section 1.3.1, we have
poor measures of time use for these categories. We also ignore ‘Child-care’.
Significant proportion of families do not have children, and for most families
with children, child-care is most probably a secondary activity. That is, par-
ents take care of their children under 13 while doing something else as the
main activity.
1.4.1 Estimation Specification
Assuming the household production function for commodity j is CES,
the relative demand function for the ratio of market goods expenditure Yj,
defined as pjXj, and time expenditure Tj is:
ln(Yj/Tj) = constant+ σjln(ρjwm + (1− ρj)wf ) (1.6)
where wm and wf are the wage rate of the husband and wife respectively,
ρj is the weight on the husband’s price of time, and σj is the elasticity of
substitution between market goods and time.19
19The coefficient σj is defined as 1/(1−θj) where θj is the parameter of the CES function
for commodity j.
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Table 1.5: NLLS Equation by Equationa, b
N constant σˆ ρˆ
Eating 2727 -.273 .344 .327
(.114) (.015) (.031)
Lodging 2738 -.620 .447 .283
(.148) (.019) (.027)
Appearance 2733 -.852 .462 .289
(.138) (.018) (.025)
Recreation 2367 -2.691 .573 .359
(.222) (.029) (.036)
a Standard errors in parenthesis.
b ρˆ is the weight on the husband’s price of time, and σˆ
is the elasticity of substitution between market goods
and time. N refers to the number of observations
used in each estimation. Control variables are urban
dummy, state dummies, number of children less than
12 years old, number of daughters over 12 years old
and number of sons over 12 years old.
We use nonlinear least squares to estimate equation (1.6). The resulting
parameter estimates for ‘Eating’, ‘Lodging’, ‘Appearance’ and ‘Recreation’
are reported in Table 1.5. The control variables included when estimating
equation (1.6) are an urban dummy, state dummies, number of children less
than 12 years old, number of daughters over 12 years old, and number of sons
over 12 years old. Our main interest centers on the estimates of the elasticity
of substitution, σˆ.
Once we control for other characteristics of the household, we find that
‘Eating’ has the lowest elasticity of substitution between market goods and
time. This is very intuitive given that food can not be substituted with any-
thing else, not even time. Also, the most important activity in this commodity
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is actually eating which is very time intensive and, in contrast to other activ-
ities like meal preparation or dish washing, cannot be paid to be done by
someone else.
‘Lodging’ has the second lowest elasticity of substitution. In the city,
activities such as house-cleaning, outdoor chores, and home repairs are very
easy to buy in the market by paying someone to do such works for you. How-
ever, in rural areas this substitution between the household’s time and the
corresponding market goods is very rare, and these activities are in most cases
performed by the members of the household. Once we consider this difference,
‘Lodging’ has a very low elasticity of substitution. In the Mexican case, the
majority of these activities are responsibility of the wife and such activities
absorb most of her time.
‘Appearance’ has the next to largest estimate of the elasticity of sub-
stitution between market goods and time. Although it is true that activities
such as personal hygiene are very time-intensive, you can certainly spend a
lot of money, relative to time, on such activities. Also, activities like laun-
dry and clothes care could be done in various ways that range from the very
time-intensive to the very goods-intensive.
Finally, ‘Recreation’ has the highest elasticity of substitution. It is not
difficult to find examples of recreational activities in which the substitution
between market goods and time is very easy. Moreover, this commodity in-
cludes very time-intensive activities such as reading, writing, conversing and
thinking, as well as very market-good intensive activities such as social events,
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sports or some hobbies.
Given that ρj does not play any role in our analysis we can simplify
our estimation by writing equation (1.6) as:
ln(Yj/Tj) = constant+ σjln(wageHH) (1.7)
where wageHH is the sum of the husband’s and wife’s wage rates.
The benefit of this simplification is that equation (1.7) is now linear. In
Table 1.6 we compare estimates of the elasticity of substitution for ‘Eating ’ ,
‘Lodging’, ‘Appearance’, and ‘Recreation’ using equations (1.6) and (1.7).
Comparing OLS and NLLS columns, we conclude there is no statistically sig-
nificant difference in the estimates of σ regardless of whether we use equation
(1.6) or (1.7).
By defining wageHH as the sum of the wages of the spouses, we are
implicitly assuming that the wages of the husband and wife have the same
weight. However, estimates of ρj using non-linear least squares are significantly
different from 0.5. Thus to check whether implicitly assuming equal weights
makes a difference in the estimates of σj we estimate the following equation:
ln(Yj/Tj) = constant+ σjln(ρˆjwm + (1− ρˆj)wf ) (1.8)
where ρˆj comes from the estimates of ρj in Table 1.5. When comparing the
estimates of the elasticities from this equation with the OLS estimates from
equation (1.7), it turns out that the estimates of the elasticities under equation
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Table 1.6: OLS and NLLS Equation
by Equationa, b
N OLS NLLS
Eating 2727 .345 .344
(.015) (.015)
Lodging 2738 .449 .447
(.019) (.019)
Appearance 2733 .465 .462
(.018) (.018)
Recreation 2367 .576 .573
(.029) (.029)
a Standard errors in parenthesis.
b Estimates in this table refer to σˆ, the
elasticity of substitution between mar-
ket goods and time. Control variables
are urban dummy, state dummies, num-
ber of children less than 12 years old,
number of daughters over 12 years old
and number of sons over 12 years old.
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(1.8) are very similar to the estimates under equation (1.7).20 Hence, assuming
equal weights or using the optimal weights from equation (1.6) makes little
difference in the estimates of the elasticities of substitution between market
goods and time. Therefore, the remainder of the study will use the estimation
based on equation (1.7).
To test whether the coefficients are the same across commodity equa-
tions we estimate the four commodity equations as a system.21 We test and
reject the hypothesis that all coefficients are equal using a Wald test. We
also test the same hypothesis and reject the null for all different pairs of co-
efficients, except for the case when we compare ‘Lodging’ and ‘Appearance’
commodities.
1.4.2 Instrumental Variables Estimation
We suspect wageHH is endogenous in equation (1.7). There are unob-
servable characteristics, such as diligence or attitude toward planning, that are
highly valued both in the labor market and in home production. Therefore,
households which are efficient at home production are usually also efficient in
the labor market, which translates into higher salaries. Without correcting
the omitted variables problem the estimates of the elasticity of substitution
will be inconsistent. To obtain consistent estimates of the elasticity we need
instruments, variables correlated with family labor earnings but not directly
20Estimates are available upon request.
21Estimates of the system of equations using SUR and the values of all Wald tests are
available upon request.
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with household production.
The set of instruments for the household labor earnings that we are
using are: whether the firm in which the husband works is unionized and the
size of the firm in which the husband and the wife are employed (measured
by the number of workers). All our instruments are valid. The union dummy
and size of the firm variables are clearly not related to the household decision
of how much market goods and how much time to use in the production of
a certain commodity, but certainly explain a lot of the wages of the husband
and the wife, and therefore the household earnings. The prices that households
pay for the market goods (implicit in the dependent variable) are clearly not
correlated with our instrumental variables. Such prices are taken as given by
the household and are not influenced by whether the spouse is a unionized
worker or not, or whether he or his wife works in a big or a small company.
To test whether the coefficients are significantly different across the
four commodities we estimate a system of equations using GMM. We estimate
system GMM using the set of instruments described above. For the first
iteration, we used the estimates from GMM equation by equation. The system
includes the household labor earnings equation as well as the four commodity
equations. The regressors in the household labor earnings equation are years
of education of both spouses, age and age squared of both spouses, firm size
for both spouses, and a union dummy for the husband. Estimates of the
elasticities of substitution are in Table 1.7. All coefficients in the table are
significantly different from zero.
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Table 1.7: System GMM with Four Commodi-
ties: Elasticity of Substitutiona
Eating Lodging Appearance Recreation
.343 .526 .576 .742
(.085) (.099) (.086) (.117)
a Standard errors in parenthesis. Estimates in this
table refer to σˆ, the elasticity of substitution be-
tween market goods and time. Control variables
are urban dummy, state dummies, number of chil-
dren less than 12 years old, number of daughters
over 12 years old and number of sons over 12 years
old. N=2,354.
Similar to the previous estimates, it is the case that ‘Eating’ has the
lowest elasticity of substitution and ‘Recreation’ has the highest elasticity of
substitution. In between we have ‘Lodging’ and ‘Appearance’, in that order.
One important difference between the estimates in Table 1.6, without
taking care of the endogeneity problem, and the estimates in Table 1.7, when
the endogeneity problem is appropriately solved, is the value of the estimates.
For all commodities except ‘Eating’, the elasticities of substitution between
market goods and time are higher. This suggests that estimation without
controlling for possible endogeneity problem is likely to underestimate the
true effect of household earnings on the decision between market goods and
time.
Using the results in Table 1.7 we test the hypothesis that the four
elasticities of substitution are equal. P-Values of the corresponding Wald tests
are reported in Table 1.8. In the first row we test the hypothesis that all
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Table 1.8: Wald Tests for System GMM Results
Hypothesis P-Values
σˆEating = σˆLodging = σˆAppearance = σˆRecreation 0.016
σˆLodging = σˆAppearance = σˆRecreation 0.305
σˆEating = σˆLodging 0.091
σˆEating = σˆAppearance 0.022
σˆEating = σˆRecreation 0.002
σˆLodging = σˆAppearance 0.639
σˆLodging = σˆRecreation 0.131
σˆAppearance = σˆRecreation 0.204
elasticities are the same and we reject it. However, according to the second
row, we cannot reject the null that the elasticities for ‘Lodging’ , ‘Appearance’,
and ‘Recreation’ are the same. This result is supported by the corresponding
p-values in the last three rows where we test the hypothesis that each pair of
these commodities’ elasticities are the same.
For this reason, we calculated the elasticities of substitution using sys-
tem GMM with instrumental variables for the commodities defined as ‘Eating’,
and the composite commodity ‘Lodging-Appearance-Recreation’. The results
are in Table 1.9.
Based on Table 1.9, it is again the case that the ‘Eating’ elasticity of
substitution is the smallest. These results are used to analyze the policy im-
plications of our theoretical model. The elasticity of substitution for ‘Eating’
is 0.440 and 0.681 for ‘Lodging-Appearance-Recreation’.
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Table 1.9: System GMM with Two Commodities:
Elasticity of Substitutiona
Eating Lodging + Appearance + Recreation
.440 .681
(.029) (.028)
a Standard errors in parenthesis. Estimates in this ta-
ble refer to σˆ, the elasticity of substitution between
market goods and time. Control variables are urban
dummy, state dummies,number of children less than
12 years old, number of daughters over 12 years old
and number of sons over 12 years old. N = 2,354.
1.5 Policy Implications
The differences in the goods-time substitution of each commodity sug-
gest the importance of setting differential goods taxes. This section calculates
the optimal goods taxes in Mexico. Based on the results in Table 1.8, we denote
Z0, Z1, and Z2 as ‘Sleeping’, ‘Eating’, and ‘Lodging-Appearance-Recreation’.
Table 1.4 shows that Mexican households spend on average 389.77 pesos and
465.29 pesos on Z1 and Z2, respectively. They also spend 113.87 hours a week
on T0, 45.33 hours on T1, and 71.80 hours on T2, and they work 62.18 hours
per week. In addition, the elasticities of substitution between goods and time
for Z1 and Z2 are 0.440 and 0.681 in that order. We assume these observed
goods expenditures and time use patterns are the outcome of the optimal
choice made by Mexican consumers under the current tax system in Mexico.
We simplify the actual Mexican tax system by setting tax rates on Z1 equal
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to 0% and Z2 equal to 15%.
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For policy analysis we use the same log-utility function in equation
(1.5). We have to recover values for the underlying parameters from our data
set. Note that we need values for the following 10 parameters: θ1, θ2, w, T ,
p1, p2, δ0, δ1, δ2, and M . The system GMM estimation in Table 1.9 gives the
values for θ1 and θ2. We set w = T = 1.
23 From the solution of the utility
optimization problem we can solve for X∗1 , X
∗
2 , T
∗
0 T
∗
1 , and T
∗
2 . Then we have
six equations24 and six parameters. Solving the system, we get p1 = 0.24,
p2 = 0.44, δ0 = 0.19, δ1 = 0.31, δ2 = 0.49, and M = 0.97.
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Table 1.10: Optimal Tax Ratea
Current(A) Optimal(B) (B)− (A)
Tax rate Eating 0.0% 7.0%
Lodging + Appearance + Recreation 15.0% 5.5%
Expenditurea Eating 389.77 288.76 -101.01
Lodging + Appearance + Recreation 465.29 599.39 134.10
Time spendingb Sleeping 113.87 113.87
Eating 45.33 52.22 6.89
Lodging + Appearance + Recreation 71.80 53.80 -18.00
Work 62.18 73.30 11.11
a Mexican pesos.
b Hours per week.
Now we have all the values we need to calculate the optimal tax rates.
22In reality, appliances and eating outside are taxed, but the expenditures on these goods
are small.
23Think of p1 and p2 as the prices of goods relative to the wage rate. Tj for j=0,1,2 is the
ratio of hours to the total time spending, that is T0 = 38.8%, T1 = 17.8%, T2 = 18.4%, and
L = 25.0%.
24Five equations from the solution of utility optimization problem and one equation from
the parameter restriction; δ0+δ1+δ2 = 1. For detailed solutions to this system of equations,
please refer to Technical Appendix A.3
25We used the fsolve function built in MATLAB to solve the six equations simultaneously.
The initial vector is [p1 p2 δ0 δ1 δ2 M ] = [1 1 0.33 0.33 0.33 1].
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From the 10, 201 (= 1012) possible tax rate combinations (s1, s2),
26 we pick all
combinations that satisfy the government budget constraint, R¯ = s1X1+s2X2.
R¯ is equal to 0.183. For each combination that satisfies the government bud-
get constraint, we calculate the corresponding indirect utility value V (s1, s2).
The pair (7.0%, 5.5%) gives the highest possible indirect utility, therefore this
vector is the optimal tax combination.
Table 1.10 shows the household’s behavior under the optimal tax sys-
tem. Under the optimal tax rates, our model predicts Mexican household
spends 288.76 pesos and 52.22 hours on Z1 weekly on average. They also
spend 599.39 pesos and use 53.80 hours on Z2 a week on average. They work
73.30 hours a week. Compared with the current tax rates, the optimal tax
system requires government to increase the tax rate on Z1 by 7 percentage
points (from 0% to 7.0%) and reduce the tax rate on Z2 by 9.5 percentage
points (from 15% to 5.5%).
1.6 Conclusions
We relax the usual assumption that individuals get utility directly from
market goods. Instead, following Becker (1965), we assume that individuals
combine market goods and time to produce commodities which ultimately
yield utility. Previous research has incorporated Becker’s idea that goods have
to be combined with time to yield utility, but it simplifies the analysis by
26For each sj ∈ {0.000, 0.005, 0.010, ..., 0.490, 0.495, 0.500} for j=1,2.
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assuming a Leontief commodity production function. Thus, our contribution
consists of allowing substitution between market goods and time in the pro-
duction of commodities by assuming a CES commodity production function.
By incorporating these assumptions into the optimal tax problem we show it is
optimal to impose lower taxes on goods used in the production of commodities
with a higher elasticity of substitution because these goods are easily substi-
tutable for time. Likewise, goods used to produce a commodity in which it is
difficult to substitute away from market goods toward time should be taxed at
a higher rate. The goal is to minimize the distortionary effects of taxes over
household utility maximization. This is an analog of the classical Corlett and
Hague (1953-1954) result, differing in that we allow for substitution between
time and goods expenditures.
Using the Mexican time use data set from 2002, we estimate the elas-
ticity of substitution between goods expenditures and time in the production
of four different commodities: ‘Eating’, ‘Lodging’, ‘Appearance’, and ‘Recre-
ation’. For these four commodities, we find that the elasticity is significantly
different from zero and ‘Eating’ has a significantly different elasticity from
‘Lodging’, ‘Appearance’, and ‘Recreation’. The elasticity of substitution for
‘Recreation’ is highest. However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the
elasticity of substitution for ‘Lodging’ is equal to the elasticity of substitution
for ‘Appearance’ and ‘Recreation’.
Combining these estimates of the elasticity of substitution with our
theoretical results, we conclude that higher taxes should be imposed on the
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market goods, like food, used in the production of ‘Eating’. Along the same
lines, lower taxes should be imposed on the market goods used in the produc-
tion of ‘Lodging’, ‘Appearance’, and ‘Recreation’. Unfortunately, the optimal
tax structure is regressive, in that it goes against the common practice of
exempting necessities such as food from sales tax bases. Comparing this opti-
mal tax system to the actual one, we can argue that the Mexican government
has traded off efficiency for equity. The actual system in Mexico has a zero
tax rate on food and a 15 percent value added tax on all other goods except
medicines. Households are very heterogeneous in their earning ability, so by
exempting food the government may be attempting to make sales taxes less
regressive. This regressivity suggests that future research needs to address the
efficiency-equity trade-off of commodity taxation.
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Chapter 2
An Unintended Consequence of Border
Enforcement
2.1 Introduction
U.S. surveillance of the border between Mexico and the United States
has increased dramatically over the last two decades. From 1984 to 2004 the
number of line watch hours by the Border Patrol along the Mexico-U.S. border
has increased more than fivefold, from 1.8 million to 9.7 million hours. The
previous two decades, 1964 to 1984, only saw a doubling of the hours from 0.9
to 1.8 million.1 The main purpose of securing the border is to capture and
deter undocumented immigrants from entering the U.S. Thus, one could be
tempted to conclude that once undocumented immigrants succeed in crossing
the border they are no longer affected by border enforcement. This would be
true if immigrants only make one trip to the host country. My hypothesis
is that this statement is not true for circular Mexican immigrants. In the
case of undocumented circular migration, as border enforcement increases,
undocumented immigrants in the United States realize that re-entering the
country will be more difficult in the future: the probability of apprehension
1Data from Mexican Migration Project NATLHIST file.
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increases, the risk of injury or death while crossing the border rises, and the
monetary costs of crossing the border escalate.2 Therefore, undocumented
circular migrants respond by increasing the length of stay of the current trip
as a way to counteract the effects of higher border vigilance.
In this paper my hypothesis is that the increase in border enforcement
in the last decades has had an unintended consequence: Mexican circular
undocumented immigrants already in the United States stay longer. I estimate
a semi-parametric hazard model similar to Meyer (1990). The model estimates
the impact of line watch hours by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection
on the probability that a Mexican undocumented immigrant leaves the U.S.
between years t and t+1 given survival up through year t while controlling for
other variables that could also influence the hazard of leaving the host country.
I use the Mexican Migration Project data for the empirical estimation in the
paper. I find that there is no effect of border enforcement on the probability
of leaving the United States by Mexican immigrants at period t+1, given that
they have survived t periods.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section contains
a review of existing literature. Section 2.3 summarizes the sample used for the
estimation, Section 2.4 presents the methodology, Section 2.5 contains the
estimation results, Section 2.6 calculates the expected duration of the last trip
for the average immigrant, and Section 2.7 concludes and discusses possible
2Massey et al. (2002).
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future research.
2.2 Literature Review
It has been long recognized that a large fraction of undocumented Mex-
ican migration to the United States is temporary and repetitive. Using data
from 1966 to 1994 from the Mexican Migration Project, Cerruti and Massey
(2004) concluded that having made an undocumented trip increases the proba-
bility of a second undocumented trip. Therefore, circular migrants in the U.S.
are affected by border enforcement since there is a higher probability they will
make more trips between Mexico and the U.S. in the future. Also, researchers
have long ago recognized the failure of the post-1986 U.S. immigration system
and its consequences. Massey et al. (2002) agreed that the border buildup
makes immigrants to have longer U.S. trip duration, lower probabilities of
return migration, and more likely to stay permanently in the U.S.
Arguments to explain the decision of how long to stay in the host
country that are not related to border enforcement are based on the investment
opportunities in the place of origin (Lindstrom (1996) and Reyes (2001)), the
economic opportunities for immigrants in the United States (Reyes (2001)),
or the household resources before migration (Reyes (2001)). Intuitively, if
investment opportunities in Mexico are good enough, then migrants will stay
longer in the United States to maximize the benefits from migration. More
economic opportunities in the United States will cause the immigrant to stay
longer in the host country. Lastly, relatively high pre-migration resources of
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the household tend to make the immigrant stay longer. This is because in this
case the principal motive to migrate is either personal reasons or long term
investments, instead of short term economic needs.
Only three studies jointly examine border enforcement and the trip
duration decision. First, Kossoudji (1992) related length of stay with a direct
consequence of border enforcement: the number of apprehensions experienced.
Results of this paper suggests that when the costs of migration increase due to
an apprehension, undocumented migrants stay in the United States longer than
if they had not been apprehended. Next, Reyes (2004) studied which factors
are the most important in explaining the changes in patterns of trip duration
among undocumented Mexican migrants to the United States. Her analysis
found no statistically significant effect of border enforcement (measured by
line watch hours) on the probability of return for undocumented immigrants.
Furthermore, she found the effect of border enforcement on the probability of
return of legal immigrants was negative and statistically significant.
The last study is a recent discussion paper by Angelucci (2005). She
studied the effect of U.S. border enforcement on the net flow of Mexican
undocumented migration. Her results indicate that border enforcement has
a negative effect on the probability of returning to Mexico from an illegal
trip. There are some important differences between the present investigation
and Angelucci (2005). The present study focuses on the last migration spell,
whereas Angelucci (2005) used the information of all migration spells. She
restricted her sample to migration decisions starting in 1972 through 1993 due
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to missing variables and lack of data. Also, she focused only on undocumented
migrants and she relied on a 15 year recall window prior to the interview. In
comparison, the only exclusions in my sample are the migration spells starting
in 2005, 2006, or 2007 because border enforcement is missing for those years.
She estimates the probability that someone returns to Mexico relative to the
number of immigrants that she observes in the United States at a specific year.
In contrast, I estimate the probability that an individual returns at period t,
given that he or she has survived up to period t− 1.
Finally, Hill (1987) argues that when border enforcement increases peo-
ple certainly make fewer trips to the host country, but whether the length of
stay increases or not depends on whether the number of trips and length of
stay are complements or substitutes. Although Hill’s paper makes a unique
contribution by providing a theoretical model to explain duration of stay and
migratory frequency, it lacks an empirical framework to test the implications
of the model. The present paper is an attempt to fill this niche.
2.3 Data
I use data from Mexican Migration Project 1183 (MMP118), a research
project conducted by Princeton University and the Universidad de Guadala-
jara. This project focuses on heads of households who have migrated at least
once. The main advantage of this data set is that it contains complete mi-
3http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/
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gration histories for the household heads, detailed information about the first
and last trip to the United States, and information about undocumented trips
to the United States. It also contains demographic characteristics, character-
istics of the origin communities, and border enforcement measures collected
from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
The main disadvantage of the data set is that it is not a nationally
representative sample. Most of the information comes from interviews con-
ducted in Mexican communities with a high propensity to migrate. Only in
recent years has the Mexican Migration Project started to include communi-
ties in Mexican states with lower propensities to migrate. Therefore, to the
extent that responses might differ in other communities, the results cannot be
generalized.
Another disadvantage is that Mexican migrants who had not returned
to the community of origin by the survey year are missing in the data. To
solve this problem, the Mexican Migration Project conducted interviews in
the United States of migrants from the same communities sampled in Mexico.
This group represents only 5% of the sample, and it does not contain samples
from all Mexican communities. Also, when comparing immigrants interviewed
in Mexico with those interviewed in United States, the latter group does not
just capture average migrants while in the United States, but also migrants
who self-select to stay in the United States longer. For this reason and because
the population of interest is Mexican undocumented, temporary, and repetitive
migrants, I dropped these individuals from the sample.
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According to the LIFE data file, the MMP118 has information on 18,539
Mexican households from 118 different Mexican communities. Of the total,
only 6,849 have household heads with migration experience to the U.S. I focus
on immigrants between 16 and 65 years old. Individuals with missing infor-
mation and with discrepancies in the duration variables were eliminated from
the sample, leaving 5,064 household heads with U.S. migration experience.
Both the data and my sample come from surveys administered from 1982 to
2007, but it goes back to 1926 with respect to the migration histories of some
individuals.
2.3.1 Summary Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the whole sample are given in Table 2.1. The
same table also presents summary statistics for undocumented migrants only,
just for reference.
Summary statistics and estimation results are based on the last trip
to the United States for two reasons. First, MMP focuses on first and last
trip, therefore there is more information about these trips than any others.
Second, focusing on the last trip to the United States rather than the first trip
minimizes recall bias.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variables All Migrants Undocumented
Demographics
Male 0.959 0.963
(0.199) (0.190)
16-24 years old at the start of the last tripa 0.234 0.262
(0.424) (0.440)
25-34 years old at the start of the last tripa 0.366 0.365
(0.482) (0.482)
35-44 years old at the start of the last tripa 0.233 0.231
(0.423) (0.421)
45-54 years old at the start of the last tripa 0.117 0.106
(0.322) (0.308)
55-65 years old at the start of the last tripa 0.049 0.036
(0.216) (0.186)
State of origin in central Mexico 0.461 0.484
(0.498) (0.500)
State of origin in the pacific coast Mexico 0.267 0.282
(0.442) (0.450)
State of origin in south Mexico 0.026 0.039
(0.159) (0.194)
State of origin in north Mexico 0.246 0.194
(0.431) (0.395)
Urban area 0.410 0.399
(0.492) (0.490)
Zero years of schooling 0.143 0.132
(0.350) (0.339)
1-6 years of schooling 0.627 0.641
(0.483) (0.480)
7-9 years of schooling 0.193 0.203
(0.395) (0.402)
10-12 years of schooling 0.016 0.013
(0.125) (0.112)
Sample size 5064 3213
aIn the empirical analysis this variable varies over time.
Standard deviation in parenthesis.
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Table 2.1 – Continued
Variables All Migrants Undocumented
More than 13 years of schooling 0.020 0.011
(0.141) (0.105)
Attachment to Mexico
Married 0.728 0.709
(0.445) (0.454)
Either mother, father, brother or sister
in the U.S. at the start of the last tripa 0.496 0.492
(0.500) (0.500)
No children less than 18 years old 0.281 0.267
(0.450) (0.442)
One child less than 18 years old 0.147 0.142
(0.355) (0.349)
Two children less than 18 years old 0.163 0.164
(0.370) (0.370)
Three children less than 18 years old 0.132 0.130
(0.339) (0.337)
More than 3 children less than 18 years old 0.275 0.297
(0.446) (0.457)
No children 18 years or older 0.729 0.756
(0.444) (0.430)
One child 18 years or older 0.080 0.080
(0.271) (0.271)
Two children 18 years or older 0.051 0.047
(0.219) (0.212)
Three children 18 years or older 0.033 0.028
(0.339) (0.166)
More than 3 children 18 years or older 0.107 0.089
(0.309) (0.285)
Immigration related
Not in the U.S. labor
force at the start of the last tripa 0.022 0.013
(0.148) (0.114)
Sample size 5064 3213
aIn the empirical analysis this variable varies over time.
Standard deviation in parenthesis.
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Table 2.1 – Continued
Variables All Migrants Undocumented
Unemployed in the U.S.
at the start of the last tripa 0.016 0.020
(0.125) (0.139)
Skilled worker in the
U.S. at the start of the last tripa 0.212 0.234
(0.409) (0.423)
Agricultural worker in the
U.S. at the start of the last tripa 0.422 0.355
(0.494) (0.478)
Unskilled worker in the
U.S. at the start of the last tripa 0.327 0.378
(0.469) (0.485)
Undocumented migrant at the
start of the last tripa 0.651 1.000
(0.477) (0.000)
Resident/citizen at the
start of the last tripa 0.217 0.000
(.412) (0.000)
Temporary documented migrant at
the start of the last tripa 0.132 0.000
(0.339) (0.000)
Stayed in a northeast U.S. state 0.033 0.036
(0.178) (0.186)
Stayed in a midwest U.S. state 0.111 0.125
(0.314) (0.331)
Stayed in a south U.S. state 0.249 0.125
(0.432) (0.331)
Stayed in a west U.S. state 0.608 0.599
(0.488) (0.490)
Last trip to U.S. before or in the 1940’s 0.030 0.019
(0.171) (0.136)
Last trip to U.S. in the 1950’s 0.078 0.030
Sample size 5064 3213
aIn the empirical analysis this variable varies over time.
Standard deviation in parenthesis.
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Table 2.1 – Continued
Variables All Migrants Undocumented
(0.267) (0.172)
Last trip to U.S. in the 1960’s 0.095 0.055
(0.293) (0.228)
Last trip to U.S. in the 1970’s 0.165 0.213
(0.371) (0.410)
Last trip to U.S. in the 1980’s 0.265 0.308
(0.441) (0.462)
Last trip to U.S. in the 1990’s 0.306 0.300
(0.461) (0.458)
Last trip to U.S. in the 2000’s 0.062 0.074
(0.240) (0.261)
Sample size 5064 3213
aIn the empirical analysis this variable varies over time.
Standard deviation in parenthesis.
The vast majority of migrants are male; only 4% of the sample are
female. 37% of migrants are between 25 and 34 years old. More than half of the
migrants in my sample have between 1 and 6 years of schooling. Almost half of
the sample comes from a state in central Mexico: Aguascalientes, Guanajuato,
Hidalgo, Mexico, Michoacan, San Luis Potosi, Puebla, and Tlaxcala. With
respect to the place of the survey, 41% are in urban areas.
In reference to the variables that measure attachment to Mexico, 73%
of the migrants are married. Only 28% have no children less than 18 years old,
and another 27% have more than three children less than 18 years old. 73%
of the sample have no children 18 years old or older. For 50% of the sample
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it is the case that either their mother, father or sibling(s) were in the U.S. at
the start of the last trip.
Relative to the variables about the migration experience, 42% of the
migrants were working in the agricultural sector at the start of their last trip,
and 32% were unskilled workers. Also, 65% of the sample are undocumented
migrants. Of the 35% left, 22% were either permanent legal U.S. resident, U.S.
citizens, refugees, or asylums. The other 13% were temporary documented
migrants who entered the U.S. using a worker visa or a tourist visa. 61% of
the sample stayed in a west U.S. state during the last trip. Finally, 56% of the
total migrants I am using in the analysis started their last trip between 1980
and 1999.
In Table 2.2 I summarize the variables that characterize the migration
spells. The risk set is the number of observations with spells that have not
ended or been censored. Failures refer to the number of spells which end during
the interval. Censored observations are those with migration spells that lasted
more than 20 years or that ended after 2004. Although the maximum number
of years spent by an immigrant in the U.S. is 61, I establish 20 years as the
censoring point because only 1.60% of the sample have spell durations greater
or equal to 20. The reason I also censored those observations that ended after
2004 is because border enforcement data is missing after this year. Around
98% of the sample is not censored. The hazard is the number of failures divided
by the risk set. The average duration of the last trip is around 24 months with
a standard deviation of 50 months.
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Table 2.2: Failures, Censoring and the Kaplan-Meier Em-
pirical Hazard
Interval Risk Set Failures Censorings Hazard Std. Error
[1, 2) 5064 3509 10 0.693 0.006
[2, 3) 1549 622 6 0.401 0.012
[3, 4) 926 270 1 0.291 0.015
[4, 5) 653 128 3 0.196 0.016
[5, 6) 522 97 3 0.186 0.017
[6, 7) 421 48 4 0.114 0.016
[7, 8) 372 45 1 0.121 0.017
[8, 9) 326 35 1 0.107 0.018
[9, 10) 291 31 0 0.106 0.018
[10, 11) 259 40 1 0.154 0.023
[11, 12) 219 18 0 0.082 0.019
[12, 13) 199 17 2 0.085 0.022
[13, 14) 182 25 0 0.137 0.026
[14, 15) 157 10 0 0.064 0.021
[15, 16) 147 15 0 0.102 0.027
[16, 17) 132 16 0 0.121 0.031
[17, 18) 114 6 2 0.053 0.026
[18, 19) 108 11 0 0.102 0.030
[19, 20) 97 6 0 0.062 0.027
To obtain a general idea about the pattern of length of stay in the
United States by Mexican migrants, Figure 2.1 presents the Kaplan-Meier
empirical hazard for the whole sample. The empirical hazard is the fraction
of spells ongoing at the start of a year which end during the year.
Figure 2.1 shows that the probability of going back to Mexico given
survival up to a given year is decreasing in the time of stay in the host country.
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Figure 2.1: Kaplan-Meier Empirical Hazard
The hazard is defined as the probability of leaving the United States at year t, given
survival up to year t−1. The Kaplan-Meier empirical hazard is the fraction of spells
ongoing at the start of the year t which end during the year and it is equivalent to
the flexible hazard when no covariates are included.
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The probability of leaving the country before the second year after migration
is 69%. Moreover, the hazard of leaving the U.S. before the third year in the
United States is 40%. In fact, the probability of leaving the United Sates
continues to decrease over time up to 6 years after migration. After six years
in the country, the probability of leaving the U.S. is very small, approximately
10%, with no statistically significant changes. This pattern suggest that the
probability of going back to Mexico decreases the longer migrants stay in the
United States. More experience in the United States harms the links with
the home country and leads to greater assimilation of immigrants to the host
country. However, the negative duration dependence could be also related
to the heterogeneity across individuals. If individuals who stay longer in the
United States are different from those who leave in the very first years in
terms of unobservable characteristics, I cannot tell whether the decline in the
hazard over time is due to assimilation effects or due to heterogeneity among
individuals.
Finally, Figure 2.2 graphs the total officer-hours devoted by the border
patrol to securing the border between Mexico and the United States from
1924 to 2004. This is the measurement of border enforcement I am use in this
paper. From the graph it is clear that vigilance of the border has increased
dramatically in the last two decades. If migrants in the United States are
planning to go back to Mexico, I expect them to internalize the level of border
enforcement in their decision of whether to leave at each point in time.
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Figure 2.2: Number of Line-watch Hours by the Border Patrol in the Border
with Mexico
The number of line-watch hours are the total number of officer-hours devoted to
patrol the border at a certain year.
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2.4 Method
I estimate a flexible hazard model for the length of stay by Mexican
immigrants in the United States. With this, I infer the effect of the number
of line watch hours by the border patrol on the probability that a Mexican
immigrant already in the U.S. leaves the country between year t and t+1, given
survival up to year t. The approach I take here is the same as in Meyer (1990).
To apply this method, I construct a panel where each observation is a vector
of covariates and binary responses that determine whether the individual has
exited the United States and whether it is censored. In this paper, a spell
is censored if it ends after 2004 because the border enforcement data are not
available for 2005, 2006 and 2007, or because it lasted 20 years or more.
The main advantage of estimating a flexible duration model is that
no assumptions about the distribution of the duration of the migration spells
are necessary. Also, this method is intended for the cases where the duration
data are only known to fall into a certain time interval, as with this data set.
Under this model, the hazard function can be different over each time interval.
Although time is discrete, the estimates are functions of the continuous time
hazard model and thus retain an easy interpretation. Another benefit of using
a flexible hazard model is that it naturally allows for time dependent covariates.
In my estimation age, whether mother, father or a sibling is in the U.S.,
occupation in the U.S., immigration status, and border enforcement vary over
time and across observations.
Let Ti be the migration spell of individual i in the United States, that
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is, the duration of the last stay in the United States by Mexican immigrant
i. Then, the hazard in this case is defined as the probability that individual i
leaves the United States between year t and year t + 1, given that individual
i has stayed in the United States up through year t. With this definition, I
parameterized the hazard using a proportional hazard form in the following
way.
Let λo(t) be the baseline hazard at time t, xi(t) be the vector of possibly
time varying explanatory variables for individual i, and β be the vector of
parameters. Then the hazard function for individual i is:
λi(t) = λo(t)exp{xi(t)′β}. (2.1)
Using equation (2.1) we can write down the probability that a duration
spell lasts until time t+ 1 given that it has lasted until t.
Using the fact that xi(t) is constant in the interval [t, t + 1) and the
following definition from Meyer (1990),
γ(t) = log
∫ t+1
t
λo(u)du, (2.2)
I can write the probability of remaining in the United States for the first ki−1
intervals as:
ki−1∏
t=1
exp{exp[γ(t) + xi(t)′β]}. (2.3)
Moreover the probability that duration Ti falls into interval ki, is given by:
1− exp{−exp[γ(ki) + xi(ki)′β]}. (2.4)
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Using the probabilities defined in equations (2.3) and (2.4), the log-likelihood
function for a sample of N individuals is:
L(γ, β) =
N∑
i=1
{δilog[1− exp(−exp[γ(ki) + xi(ki)′β])]−
ki−1∑
t=1
exp[γ(t) + xi(t)
′β]}
(2.5)
where γ = [γ(1), ..., γ(T − 1)]′, Ci is the censoring time for individual i, δi =
1 if Ti ≤ Ci, i.e. the observation is censored, and 0 otherwise, and ki =
min{int(Ti), Ci}.
Since observations lasting 20 periods or more are censored at 20, the
log-likelihood function is maximized through standard techniques with respect
to the 19 elements of γ and the vector β.
2.5 Results
In column A of Table 2.3 are the results from the specification when
only the border enforcement measure is included as explanatory variable. The
effect of border enforcement on the hazard of leaving the United States is mea-
sured by the logarithm of the number of officer-hours assigned to secure the
border between Mexico and United States each year. High levels of border
enforcement are expected to decrease the hazard because it increases the ex-
pected costs of future trips to the United States. According to these results, a
one percent increase in border enforcement decreases the probability of going
back to Mexico by 0.05%. The coefficient is significant at 5% level.
The results in column B of Table 2.3 correspond to the specification
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where all exogenous variables are included. These variables are assumed to
control for demographic characteristics, variables that measure attachment to
Mexico, variables related to the migration experience, and time indicators. In
this case, border enforcement is no longer statistically significant. However
the sign is still negative. It implies that a 1% increases in border enforcement
decreases the probability of leaving the United States by 0.02%.
That the coefficient corresponding to line watch hours is not signifi-
cant is related to the inclusion of the decade indicators, the immigrant status
indicators, and the education indicators. When the decade indicators are
excluded but all other regressors are included, the coefficient for border en-
forcement is -0.007 with p-value=0.80. In contrast, when only the migrant
status indicators are omitted the coefficient for border enforcement is -0.06
with p-value=0.29. Years of schooling indicators are also very important in
determining the insignificance of border enforcement. When these indicators
are excluded, the coefficient of the border enforcement measure is -0.05 with
p-value=0.40. When excluding either the decade and status indicators, or the
decade and education indicators, an increase of 1% of the border enforcement
coefficient implies a 0.05% decrease in the hazard of leaving the United States.
In both cases, the coefficient is significant at 5% level.4
One concern with the results in column B of Table 2.3 is that some
regressors are probably not exogenous. Hence, I estimate the hazard model
4Results are available upon request.
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with only the following regressors: male indicator, Mexican region indicators,
urban indicator, decade indicator, age indicator, and focusing only on undoc-
umented immigrants. In this case, the coefficient for line watch hours is -0.071
with p-value=0.34: the coefficient is negative but still insignificant.5
Going back to column B of Table 2.3, with respect to demographic
characteristics, male migrants are more likely to go back to Mexico. In fact,
the hazard for them is 16% higher than the corresponding hazard for women at
10% level of significance. For the age indicators, the omitted group corresponds
to individuals who are more than 54 years old but less than 66 years old.
None of the indicators for age is significant at 10%. All of the coefficients
have negative sign except for the indicator for age between 35 and 44 years
old. Perhaps age is not significant because most immigrants stay less than two
periods in the U.S.
I also include indicators for the region in Mexico where the migrants
come from. The omitted region is northern Mexico. All indicators are signifi-
cant at 1% level in this case. The indicator for central Mexico is positive: that
is, immigrants whose home state is in central Mexico are 10% more likely to
leave the United States relative to the comparison group. Immigrants whose
communities of origin are in the Pacific coast have 20% higher hazard of leav-
ing the United States relative to those from northern Mexico. In contrast,
immigrant with origins in the south are 42% less likely to go back to Mexico
5Results are available upon request.
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than people from the north. This last result is in accordance with the hypoth-
esis that migrants who come from farther regions experience higher costs of
migration, which make them less likely to go back to their places of origin.
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However, that is not also true for immigrants who come from the Pacific
coast or from central Mexico, regions that are still far from the U.S. compared
to northern Mexican states. Given that I control for occupation in the U.S., the
legal status in the U.S., and the year when the last trip started, these results
are probably related to unobserved characteristics of the migrants from these
regions that make them more likely to go back to Mexico. An urban indicator
was also included, but it is not significant. Its negative sign implies that
immigrants from urban areas are less likely to leave the United States than
migrants from rural areas.
Finally, I include indicators for years of schooling, where the omitted
group is having more than 12 years of education. The first three coefficients
are significant at 1% level, the other two are significant at 5% level. Having no
formal education at all makes immigrants 37% less likely to go back to Mexico
than the comparison group. Migrants with at least one year of schooling, but
less than 7 years of schooling have a hazard 39% lower of going back to Mexico
than the comparison group. Migrants with more than 6 years of education
but less than 10 are 51% less likely to leave the United States. Those with
education between 9 and 12 years of education are 33% less likely to go back
to Mexico. These results imply that less educated immigrants stay longer in
the U.S. relative to more educated immigrants. One explanation could be that
for less educated immigrants the benefits from working in the U.S. are greater
than for highly educated immigrants.
Relative to the variables that measure attachment to Mexico, if the
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migrant’s mother, father, or sibling(s) are in the United States at the start
of the last trip, the Mexican migrant is 10% more likely to return to Mexico
and the coefficient is significant at 1% level. Also, being married increases the
probability of going back to Mexico by 9% and the coefficient is significant at
5% level. This is probably related to the fact that migrants’ spouses stay in
Mexico while they are in the United States. This is a very good indicator that
for migrants family ties are very important and a motive to return to Mexico.
The last set of variables in this category are indicators for total number of
children at the time the last trip starts. Only two indicators are significant.
First, not having children less than 18 years old make immigrants 12% less
likely to go back to Mexico relative to having 4 or more children less than
18 years old; this coefficient is significant at 5% level. Second, having three
children more than 18 years old make immigrants less likely to go back to
Mexico than immigrants with more than three adult children, however the
coefficient is just marginally significant (p=0.09). Thus, having no young
children or having adult children allow immigrants to stay longer in the U.S.
The variables related to the migration experience are the most inter-
esting. Compared to immigrants who are unskilled workers in the U.S., immi-
grants who are not in the labor force are 54% more likely to go back to Mexico.
The same is true for immigrants who were unemployed while in the United
States, in fact, they are 91% more likely to go back to Mexico. In contrast,
skilled workers are 8% less likely to return to their places of origin. These
results imply that immigrants who are lucky enough to have a job, or better
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yet, to have a skilled job, are less likely to go back to Mexico. As expected,
agricultural workers are 44% more likely than unskilled workers to leave the
United States because most agricultural jobs are seasonal. All the coefficients
related to occupation are significant at 1% level, except for skilled workers
which is significant at 5%.
Compared to temporary migrants, undocumented migrants are 40%
less likely to go back to Mexico and the coefficient is significant at 1% level.
The most likely reason is that for undocumented migrants the cost of making
another trip between the two countries is very high. Therefore, they stay
longer to get the most benefits from the trip. Mexican immigrants who are
legal U.S. residents or U.S. citizens are also less likely to leave the United
States than Mexican migrants who have only temporary permission to stay in
the country. Permanent immigrants are 70% less likely to go back to Mexico
and the significance level is 1%. Permanent documented migrants are able
to cross the border without restrictions; however, their attachment to U.S. is
much stronger than their attachment to Mexico, making them more likely to
stay in the U.S.
I also include indicators for the regions in the United States where
migrants stay longer. The omitted region is the West. The coefficients for
the three other regions are significant at 1% level. Migrants who reside in
northeast states are 26% less likely than west migrants to return to Mexico.
Again, the reason could be that for migrants living in the northeast is more
costly than for migrants in the west to travel between the two countries. In
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line with this argument, immigrants in the midwest have a hazard 20% lower
of leaving the U.S. than migrants in the west. Immigrants established in the
south during the last trip have a 11% greater hazard of going back to Mexico
than immigrants established in the West. The cost of migration is higher the
farther from Mexico, thus making immigrants less likely to leave the United
States.
Finally, most of the time indicators are significant. Immigrants who
started the trip before the 1950 decade are 45% less likely to leave the U.S.
than migrants who started the trip in the first half of the 2000 decade. Rela-
tive also to the latter, immigrants who started the trip in the 1950’s, 1960’s,
and 1970’s, have a hazard of returning to Mexico 43%, 42% and 36% lower,
respectively. Immigrants who started the trip in the 1980 decade are less
likely to go back to Mexico but the coefficient is not statistically significant.
Lastly, immigrants who started the trip in the 1990’s are more likely to leave
the U.S. relative to the comparison group, although the coefficient is not sig-
nificant. This pattern is explained by the way the Mexican Project data is
collected. For an immigrant to be surveyed he has to be in Mexico. Therefore,
immigrants who started their trip in recent years have shorter trips than immi-
grants who started their trips decades before. Also, immigrants who started
their trips in earlier decades, have longer migration spells. To see if these
patterns are affecting the significance and magnitude of the line watch hours
variable, I estimate the hazard model restricting the sample according to the
year each immigrant started his last trip. All immigrants who started the trip
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before 1960 or after 1999 were excluded. The results indicate that border en-
forcement is still insignificant, although of the same magnitude as in column
B.6
2.5.1 Comparing Undocumented and Permanent Documented Mi-
grants
In column C of Table 2.3 I restrict the sample to those who entered
the U.S. as undocumented immigrants, whereas in column D of Table 2.3 I
restricted the sample to those who entered as residents, citizens, refugees, or
asylums of U.S. The coefficient for border enforcement in the case of docu-
mented immigrants is much closer to zero than the coefficient for the same
variable when the sample is restricted to undocumented immigrants, just as
expected. However, the border enforcement measure is not significant in either
case.
There are very important differences between undocumented and doc-
umented migrants. When I restrict the sample to permanent legal migrants,
it is still the case that the male indicator and the indicators for age are not
significant as in the case of undocumented. However, when comparing the co-
efficients for the indicators for education, all of them are significant in the case
of documented migrants and only one for undocumented immigrants (the 7 to
9 years of schooling indicator). Moreover, the coefficients are greater in mag-
nitude for permanent documented immigrants. Less educated immigrants are
6The results are available upon request.
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much more likely to stay in the host country if they are residents. This is prob-
ably a reflection of the benefit of staying in the U.S. for more disadvantaged
immigrants in terms of human capital.
Another important difference arises according to the region of origin.
For undocumented immigrants, coming from a southern Mexico state decreases
the probability of going back to Mexico significantly. In comparison, for doc-
umented permanent migrants the south Mexican region indicator is not sig-
nificant anymore. In fact, for this group it is the case that the central and
Pacific Mexico indicators are significant and with positive sign. This implies
that most documented migrants are from these two regions.
For undocumented immigrants, having no children or having one child
makes their hazard of going back to Mexico lower. However, neither number
of children nor age significantly affect the hazard of going back to Mexico by
permanent documented immigrants. This is most likely because their children
are also in the United States with them. Along the same lines, the U.S.
region where they stayed during the last trip affects the hazard of leaving for
undocumented immigrants, but not for documented ones. For documented
immigrants the cost of migration is more or less the same, no matter where
they are established. However, for undocumented immigrants, the farther from
the border the greater the cost of migration.
With respect to the occupation of immigrants while in the United
States, the coefficients for both groups are very similar in terms of sign, mag-
nitude, and significance, with only one important difference. Undocumented
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Mexican immigrants are 7% more likely to leave the United States if they are
not in the labor force relative to unskilled undocumented immigrants. How-
ever, in the same conditions, permanent documented immigrants are 87% more
likely to leave the U.S.
Finally, the decade indicators for documented immigrants are all sig-
nificant except for the 1990 decade. This compares with the case of undoc-
umented immigrants where none of the indicators for when they started the
trip to the U.S. are significant. Moreover, the coefficients are much bigger
for the permanent legal immigrants. For documented immigrants, those who
started the trip more recently are less likely to stay in the U.S. In the case of
undocumented immigrants, I still observe that immigrants who arrive to the
U.S. in earlier decades are less likely to leave the United States; however the
coefficients are not significant and not very different for different decades.
2.5.2 Comparing Immigrants According to the Year They Started
the Last Trip to the United States
Looking at the durations, there is a clear difference between those who
started the last trip before the 1980 decade and those who started the last
trip after the 1970 decade. Based on this, I divided the sample in two parts,
leaving 20 years for the second part. The results in column E of Table 2.3 refer
to the period 1926-1985 and the results in column F of the same table refer to
the period 1985-2004.
The first difference is that for the period 1926-1985, the border enforce-
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ment coefficient is negative; in contrast, the coefficient in the period 1986-2004
is positive. However, in both cases the coefficient is not significant. Another
important difference is that the male indicator is positive and significant in
the first period, but negative and insignificant for the second period. Interest-
ingly, age indicators are negative and marginally significant for the 1926-1985
period, whereas in 1986-2004, the coefficients are positive and not significant.
With respect to education there are basically no differences in any sense. Dif-
ferences arise again relative to the region of origin in Mexico. Immigrants who
migrated in earlier years are more likely to come from the central and Pacific
regions for which the coefficients are positive and significant. In contrast, im-
migrants who started the last trip in more recent years are more likely to come
from south Mexico, the coefficient is significant and has negative sign.
With respect to children, having no children affects negatively the haz-
ard of recent migrants and does not affect the hazard of earlier migrants. Also,
having no adult children affects negatively the hazard of migrants who started
the trip in 1986-2004 negatively. However, for the first period, the coefficient
of this indicator is not significant and it is positive. Relative to the occupation
in the U.S. indicators, there are no huge differences. Finally, being undocu-
mented or permanent documented migrant has a negative and significant effect
on the hazard of leaving the U.S. for immigrants who migrated before 1986.
But for immigrants who migrated after 1985, although both coefficients are
not significant, the coefficient is positive for undocumented immigrants and
negative for resident immigrants.
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2.5.3 Using Border Enforcement that Varies Across Border Re-
gions
The measure of border enforcement I have used so far is the yearly to-
tal number of hours that Border Patrol officers spent securing the Mexico-U.S.
border. Perhaps one reason the border enforcement measure is not significant
is because yearly variation is not enough to identify the effect of the enforce-
ment in the individual decision of how long to stay. One way to improve
my identification strategy is to have variation over time and across border
regions. Vigilance is not uniform along the 1,969 miles of the Mexico-United
States border. The U.S. Border Patrol has divided the border in 11 sectors:
San Diego, CA; El Centro, CA; Yuma, AZ; Tucson, AZ; El Paso, TX; Marfa,
TX; Del Rio, TX; Laredo, TX; and McAllen, TX. Across these sectors, the
number of hours that the Border Patrol officers guard the border are differ-
ent. Using data collected by Dr. Gordon Hanson available at on website7,
I run the same specification as in column C. The way I assign the level of
border enforcement to each individual is as follows. Looking at the data, I
noticed that undocumented immigrants cross the border by the region closest
to their destination, unless their destination is the northeast or the midwest.
For example, undocumented migrants staying in Texas crossed by Texas. In
contrast, undocumented immigrants staying in New York during their last trip
crossed by either Arizona, or Texas, and the vast majority through California.
Undocumented immigrants living in the state of Washington crossed through
7http://irps.ucsd.edu/faculty/faculty-directory/gordon-hanson.htm
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California, too. If their destination is a state in the south, say Florida, they
cross by Texas. Therefore I assigned the border enforcement measure corre-
sponding to the region closest to their destination, except for undocumented
immigrants whose destinations were located in the northeast and midwest.
In those cases, they were assigned the total of line-watch hours in the eleven
sectors. The data are monthly and although I know the duration in months,
I don’t know which month they started the trip, so I calculated the yearly
average and use it for the estimation. The disaggregated data only cover from
1977 to 2004, so I restrict the sample to those years.8
The results are not different from those when I restrict the sample to
undocumented immigrants who started the trip between 1977 and 2004 and
use the border enforcement measure that only varies over time. The border
enforcement measure using line watch hours that vary across region and across
years has negative coefficient and, as before, is not significant.
2.6 Expected Duration of the Last Trip
In this section I calculate the expected duration of a trip to the United
States by an average Mexican immigrant to see how different characteristics
affect the expected migration spell, in terms of months.
To construct the expected value of the migration spell, T , using the
estimated hazard model, recall the definition of the hazard function as follows:
8Results are available upon request.
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λt = P (t ≤ T < t+ 1 | T ≥ t). (2.6)
It is possible to rewrite equation (2.6) as:
λt =
P (t ≤ T ≤ t+ 1)
P (T ≥ t+ 1) (2.7)
λt =
P (T ≤ t+ 1)− P (T ≤ t)
P (T ≥ t+ 1) . (2.8)
Since the hazard was assumed to be constant for intervals of size one, then the
hazard is:
λt =
∑t+1
r=1 P (r − 1 ≤ T ≤ r)−
∑t
r=1 P (r − 1 ≤ T ≤ r)
1−∑tr=1 P (r − 1 ≤ T ≤ r) (2.9)
λt =
P (t ≤ T ≤ t+ 1)
1−∑tr=1 P (r − 1 ≤ T ≤ r) . (2.10)
I can use equation (2.10) to solve for P (t ≤ T ≤ t+ 1) as follows:
P (t ≤ T ≤ t+ 1) = λt(1−
t∑
r=1
P (r − 1 ≤ T ≤ r)). (2.11)
I know λt, for t = 1, ...19 by substituting the estimates for γ and β in
equation (2.1). Then,
P (t ≤ T ≤ t+ 1) = λt
t−1∏
r=0
(1− λr−1) for 1 ≤ t ≤ 19 (2.12)
Since I censored observations at 20, P (20 ≤ T ≤ ∞) is just one minus
the sum of the nineteen probabilities defined by equation (2.12).
I plug these probabilities into the definition of the expected value which
yields:
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E(T ) =
20∑
t=1
tP (t ≤ T ≤ t+ 1). (2.13)
This is the expected duration of a trip to the United States by Mexican
immigrants. To evaluate the probabilities I picked the characteristics of an
average immigrant. That is, a Mexican male undocumented immigrant who
comes from a rural community in the Pacific coast. He has less than 6 years of
schooling. He is married and has more than three children less than 18 years
old and no adult children. He made his last trip to California in 1980, when
he was 33 years old. He had a brother living in the United States during that
last trip. His job in that occasion was in the agricultural sector. The expected
duration in the United States for an immigrant with these characteristics is
15 months.
I predicted the log-line watch hours for the following 20 years after 2004
using a polynomial order 2 trend line using the observed border enforcement.
If everything else stays the same, the expected duration for an average Mexican
immigrant would still be 15 months. Now, suppose border enforcement stays
at the minimum level between 1924 and 2004. In this case the the expected
duration decreases by one month. Hence, even if border enforcement were
significant, the effect on the expected duration is small.
If instead of being an undocumented immigrant, the average immi-
grant is a legal permanent resident, then the expected duration of a trip is
19 months: 4 months greater than the average immigrant. Now, consider the
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case in which this average immigrant does not start the last trip to the U.S.
in 1980 but in 1940. In that case, the average duration is also 19 months. The
region from which migrants have their origins is very important. If the average
Mexican immigrant comes from southern Mexico, the average duration in the
United States is then 26 months: 11 months longer. Moreover, the region in
the U.S. where migrants establish is also very important determining the haz-
ard. Someone who stayed in a northeast state has an expected duration of 18
months, whereas someone established in Texas has an expected duration of 14
months everything else the same. If the average immigrant was unemployed,
the expected duration would be only 13 months. In contrast, if he had a skilled
job, the expected duration of the trip is 24 months.
2.7 Conclusions and Future Work
In the case of circular Mexican migration to the United States using the
Mexican Migration Project data, I find that there is no effect of border enforce-
ment on the probability of leaving the United States by Mexican immigrants
at period t+ 1, given that they have survived t periods.
I find that undocumented immigrants have longer migration spells than
temporary documented migrants, but shorter spells than permanent docu-
mented migrants. The hazard is 40% lower for undocumented and 70% lower
for permanent documented immigrants, relative to immigrants with temporary
status.
Also, I find that the Mexican region from which these immigrants come
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from is very important in determining the hazard of leaving the United States.
Moreover, the region in the United States where these immigrants live during
that last trip is also very important. Both variables are related to the cost of
migration: the greater the cost, the longer they will stay in U.S.
The occupation they had in the United States during the last trip is
very important. If immigrants worked in the agricultural sector, they are 44%
more likely to return to Mexico than unskilled migrant workers. Immigrants
who were unemployed in the United States, had a hazard 90% greater of going
back to Mexico than unskilled migrant workers.
There are some important issues I will continue working on in the fu-
ture. First, immigrants are clustered based on the year they started their trip
to the United States since they face the same level of line-watch hours. There-
fore, I need to compute the corresponding robust standard errors. Second,
it is important that I control for economic conditions in Mexico and in the
United States that could be systematically related to border enforcement. I
also need to test my hypothesis using other measures of border enforcement
such as apprehensions and dollars spend by the border patrol in securing the
border. Following Meyer (1990), it is also possible to control for unobserved
heterogeneity when estimating a flexible hazard. This could be very important
in understanding the hazard of leaving the United States. Moreover, one char-
acteristic of the data that I had not exploited yet and can also easily address
with a flexible hazard, is the fact that I observe multiple migration spells for
the same individual.
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Chapter 3
Time and Money Costs Related to Child Care
3.1 Introduction
This study uses 2002 data from the Mexican Time Use Survey and the
National Household Survey of Income and Expenditure to examine the time
Mexican mothers dedicate to take care of their children and the amount of
money spent by the household in raising children. The main contribution of
this essay is that it analyzes child care time use and child care monetary ex-
penditures simultaneously, in contrast to most of the previous literature. First,
I estimate a reduced form model for weekly mother’s child care time use and
weekly household child care expenditures. I distinguish between working and
non-working mothers, test whether there are differences overall, and analyze
what is the role of income without counting mother’s income in the allocation
of time and money in child care for both groups. Second, I estimate the effect
of the wage rate, i.e. the opportunity cost of time, in the mother’s child care
expenses in terms of time and money.
The main results are the following. According to the structural model,
mothers significantly increase child care monetary expenditures as their wage
rate increases. In contrast, the predicted log-wage rate is not significant in
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the child care time use equation. With respect to the reduced form model,
the age of the youngest child is the most important determinant of both child
care time and money expenditures. This holds for both working and non-
working mothers. The effect of mother’s years of schooling is positive and
significant on child care monetary expenses for both working and non-working
mothers. Mother’s education is also significant in the mother’s child care time
use equation. However, it has positive sign for working mothers and negative
sign for non-working mothers. This implies that more educated mothers spend
more money on their children, but more or less time depending on whether
they work or not.
Household income without counting mother’s income positively affects
child care related expenditures for both groups and such effects are statistically
significant. Such measures of income also positively affects a mother’s child
care time use but the coefficient is only significant for non-working mothers.
In fact, the coefficient is almost 21 times greater for non-working mothers than
for working mothers.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 3.2 I briefly summarize the
literature related to this study. Section 3.3 I describe the data, the population
of interest, and summarize the variables used through out the analysis. The
next section contains the econometric model and the results obtained from its
estimation. Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.2 Literature Review
The literature related to the present investigation is divided in two
categories: those papers that study child care expenditures and those that
study child care time use, both related to the women’s labor supply. Given
that I have information both on time use and monetary expenses related to
children for the same family, I will study the relationship between the two
when different individual or household characteristics change, including the
wage rate.
There are a few studies that focus on child care time use and its relation-
ship with the mother’s labor supply. The most recent paper is by Kalenkoski
et al. (2009) which focuses on the effect of parents’ wages on parents’ child
care time use and labor supply. Using the 2000 United Kingdom Time Use
Survey, they estimated gender-specific multivariate models of the time each
parent spends in child care and market work. Given the characteristics of the
data, they could distinguish between primary child-care activities, and pas-
sive child-care activities. They could also distinguish between weekdays and
weekends, allowing them to control for the timing of activities. Since men
and especially women self-select into labor force participation and wages are
probably endogenous, the authors predict wages for men and women. They
controlled for two sources of selectivity: nonemployment and misreporting.
To identify the selection components, the non-labor income indicator and the
number of other adults in the household were excluded from the log-wage
equation. To identify the effects of wages on time use, they excluded infor-
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mation on own and partner’s education and potential experience, the local
unemployment rate, and the region of residence from the time-use equations.
The relevant results are that women work more when their wages increase and
less when the wages of their partners increases. Also, mothers dedicate more
time to child care as their partners’ wages increase. However, women’s child
care time does not change with changes in their own wages. The methodology
in the present paper is close to that used in this paper with the difference that
I incorporate children-care expenses into the analysis.
In another recent paper, Friedberg and Webb (2005) concluded that for
two-earner households, as the wage rate of the mother increases, she spends
significantly more time in leisure activities. Also, they had evidence that
mothers spend more time with children as their relative wages rise and that
these effects vary substantially with the age of the child. For this analysis
the authors used the first year of the American Time Use Survey. Similar
evidence was presented by Hallberg and Klevmarken (2003). For women, an
increase in labor supply has a negative effect on child care related time, but the
effect is not significant. Their data comes from the Swedish household panel
study conducted in 1984 and 1993, when time surveys were included. Using
data from a survey conducted in Netherlands during 1992, Brink and Groot
(1997) found that mother’s labor supply responds positively to increases in
the hourly wage, although the increase is very small. Furthermore, they found
that a mother’s child care time also rises. In fact, an increase in time spent
on child care by women with young children does not reduce labor supply.
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Finally, Kooreman and Kapteyn (1987) found that female time use is more
elastic with respect to her wage rate and the wage rate of her husband than
male time use. In particular, as the female wage increases, mothers spend less
time in child care, and less time in the labor market. However, their results
were not statistically significant, probably because of the small sample size.
The data come from a survey conducted by the University of Michigan during
1975 and 1976.
There is abundant literature that studies child care expenditures and
women’s labor supply: Ribar (1995), Ribar (1992), Blau and Robins (1988)
and Connelly (1992) are some of the most important papers, just to mention
a few. In this literature child care costs refer only to paid child care arrange-
ments: baby sitting or day care services. In my paper, however, child care
expenditures also include all other goods expenditures exclusively for chil-
dren: diapers, children’s apparel, children’s shoes, baby’s accessories, baby
food, etc. From a strict point of view, all these goods could be produced at
home using very time intensive production processes. Therefore, they play the
same role as child care arrangements. Moreover, for Mexican families in my
sample paid child care is a very rare practice. Only 64 of the 1330 families
have nonzero child care arrangements expenditures. One possible reason is the
traditional gender role ideology which promotes that children have to be cared
by their mothers. Another explanation is that families are less likely to buy
such services from the market if family members or relatives help with child
care at little or no direct cost.
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To my knowledge, there are only two papers that put together money
and time child care related expenditures in a particular way. The first one
is the seminal work by Cogan (1977, 1981) that developed a theory in which
child care represents a fixed cost of labor market entry. The theory is very
general and it easily applies to costs related to child rearing. Cogan started
by discussing the implications of fixed time and fixed money costs of labor
market entry. Then he relaxed the assumption that such costs are fixed and
derived the corresponding comparative statics. Although he did not have all
the data necessary to test his theory, he provided an empirical analysis by
using the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Women corresponding to
1967. The most important result is that entry costs are of prime importance
in determining the labor supply behavior of married women. The other paper
is an application of the theory in Cogan (1981) by Tan (1997).
3.3 Data
The data used in this paper come from the National Time Use Survey
20021 from Mexico (ENUT) and the National Household Survey of Income
and Expenditure2 (ENIGH). These are nationally representative surveys which
includes both urban and rural households. The time use survey interviews all
individuals who were aged 12 years or older at the time of the survey. The
total sample includes 4,783 households and 20,342 individuals. The objective
1Encuesta Nacional del Uso del Tiempo 2002, http://www.inegi.gob.mx.
2Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto de los Hogares, http://www.inegi.gob.mx.
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of the survey is to measure the activities undertaken by men and women within
the household.3
With respect to the objective of this paper, the main advantage of this
data set is that I observe both weekly child care time use by mothers, as
well as weekly child care expenditures by the household.4 The definitions for
child care time use and expenditures are shown in Table 3.1. Notice that my
definition of child-related expenditures not only refer to baby-sitting expenses
or day care costs. It refers to all costs incurred by the household when children
are present, especially little children.
3.3.1 Population of Interest
I am focusing on mothers less than 65 years old whose children are less
than 18 years old. In the whole sample there are only 4054 families in which
the wife is 65 years old or less. Of these families, only 3520 survived because
there were children present. If the mother was a labor force participant but did
not receive a monetary payment, the household was not included because I do
not know the value of the non-monetary compensation she received instead.
I eliminate outliers in terms of child care time use and wage rates. Also,
I exclude observations with missing non-mother’s labor income. The final
sample includes 2696 households. Only 28% of the mothers in this sample
participated in the labor market. Based on official Mexican data, 35% of all
3For a more complete description of the data please refer to Section 1.3.
4I also observe the child care time use of all other members of the household, including
household personnel, but I have not yet used this information in the analysis.
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Table 3.1: Child Care Time and Child Care Expenditures
Child Care Definition
Mother’s Help a household child to eat;
weekly hours bathe and dress a household child;
dedicated to: play and talk with a household child;
apply a special therapy to a household child;
take care of a household child;
help a household child with homework;
attend school related meetings, festivals, etc.;
and, take or pick up a family member to any place.
Household’s Diapers;
weekly expenditures on: baby shampoo, baby soap, etc.;
day care;
additional learning classes;
baby-sitter;
children’s apparel;
children’s shoes;
baby’s accessories;
toys, games;
and, baby food.
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women 14 years or older participated in the labor market in 2002. The labor
force participation in my sample is smaller because I restricted the sample to
women with children.
In this sample I am including mothers who reported to be self-employed.
Of the 28% who reported to be labor force participants, only 37% of them are
self-employed. To construct the wage rate for this group, I divided the weekly
income by the weekly hours of work.
3.3.2 Summary Statistics
Summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis are
in Table 3.2. The average age among mothers is 38. The mean mother’s years
of schooling is six, that is, the equivalent to completed primary school. In this
sample, only 28% of mothers worked during the week before the interview. If
they worked, they dedicated on average 36 hours in a week to the labor market.
On average, mothers dedicate 17 hours in the week to child care activities. The
log-wage rate for those mothers who work has a mean of 3.7, that is, 40 pesos
per hour as of 2002. The household income without counting the mother’s
income is on average 2414 pesos a week. The average expenditures on child
care are 51 pesos per week.5 There is a 38% chance that the age of the youngest
child is less than five years old, 11% chance that it is either five or six years
5Compared to the time mothers spent with their children, this is a very small. This
average is also smaller than the weekly child care expenditures in Table 1.4. The reason
is that in that definition child care expenditures included education expenses, which are
excluded in this case.
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old, and 24% probability that it is between 7 and 12 years old. On average,
there are around two children less than 18 years old in the household. Finally,
70% of the households are located in urban areas.
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Mother’s age 38.193 11.039 17 65 2696
Mother’s years of schooling 6.416 4.294 0 23 2696
Mother’s labor force participation 0.285 0.452 0 1 2696
Youngest child age 0-4 0.376 0.484 0 1 2696
Youngest child age 5-6 0.107 0.309 0 1 2696
Youngest child age 7-12 0.240 0.427 0 1 2696
Number of children age 0-11 1.384 1.256 0 7 2696
Number of children age 12-17 0.633 0.858 0 5 2696
Urban indicator 0.704 0.456 0 1 2696
Non-mother’s log-weekly incomea 7.789 0.985 2.657 11.451 2696
Mother’s weekly child-care hours 16.895 24.545 0 148.5 2696
Household’s weekly
child care expendituresa/100 0.513 0.695 0 8.965 2696
Mother’s log-wage ratea 3.740 1.093 0.223 9.360 769
Mother’s weekly working hours 36.334 17.404 0.5 88 769
aIn Mexican pesos as of 2002.
The most important characteristic of the sample is that a great propor-
tion of these women do not participate in the labor market. For this reason, I
expect non-mother’s log-weekly income to play an important role not only in
child care expenditures, but also in mother’s child care time use.
3.4 Econometric Model
I am interested in estimating the effect of the wage rate (Y1), i.e. the
opportunity cost of time, in the mother’s child care expenses in terms of time
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(Y2) and money (Y3).
Y1 = Z1β1 + u1 (3.1)
Let Y1 denote the mother’s log-wage rate determined by Z1, a vector
of exogenous and observable characteristics and an error term denoted u1.
Y2 = α2Y1 + Z2β2 + u2 (3.2)
Let Y2 specifically refer to the mother’s weekly child care time use. This
time use is determined by the wage rate, a vector of exogenous characteristics
denoted by Z2, and the error term u2.
Y3 = α3Y1 + Z2β3 + u3 (3.3)
Similarly to previous equation, let Y3, the household’s weekly child
care expenditures, be determined by the vector of demographic and household
characteristics Z2, as well as an error term denoted u3.
The model is complicated because the wage rate appears as a regressor
in the last two equations of the system and it is not always observed. Even
though hours of work, child care time use, and child care related expenditures
are always observed, the wage rate is only observed for those mothers with
positive labor supply.
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3.4.1 Reduced Form Model
The simplest way to estimate this model is by transforming the system
above into a system of unrelated regressions (SUR) model by substituting the
wage rate equation into the other two equations, that is, plug equation (3.1)
into equations (3.2) and (3.3). By doing this, I obtain the following system.
Y2 = Z1γ2 + Z2β2 + ε2 (3.4)
Y3 = Z1γ3 + Z2β3 + ε3 (3.5)
I estimate this system by OLS equation by equation. Recall that system
OLS estimation of a SUR model is equivalent to OLS equation by equation.
All equations include state indicators. Table 3.3 has the results for the whole
sample. Column A of that table displays the results for the mother’s child care
time use equation. I have that the variable related to the age of the mother,
the indicators for the age of the youngest child, the number of children age 12-
17, and the non-mother’s log weekly household income are the variables with
coefficients significantly different from zero. The effect of the mother’s age in
the child care time use is decreasing at an increasing rate. Most probably,
this is related to the fact that as mothers get older, children also get older,
therefore child care time decreases at an increasing rate.
Based on the indicators for the age of the youngest kid in the household,
it is the case that mothers spend more time with their children when the last
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child is younger. Compared to the case where the youngest child is 13 years
or older, mothers dedicate 25 more hours per week if their youngest child is
less than five years old. If the youngest child is 5 or 6 years old, the mother
spends 13 more hours to child care, relative to the comparison group. And if
the child is between 7 and 12 years old, the increase in child care time use is 6
hours per week. This results are consistent with those obtained in Kalenkoski
et al. (2009) and Kooreman and Kapteyn (1987).
Education is not significant although it has the expected sign. This
means that more educated mothers, who perhaps earn higher wages and there-
fore have a higher opportunity cost of time, spend less time with their children.
One more year of education decreases child care time use by less than half an
hour. The number of children less than 12 years old is not significant but
has the expected positive sign. More young children in the household require
more time by the mother to take care of them. In contrast, a greater number
of children between the ages of 12 and 17 decreases the mother’s weekly time
dedicated to child care, although the coefficient is only significant at 10% level.
This is consistent with the idea that children in this range of ages require less
care time from their mothers, or perhaps that they help their mothers to take
care of younger children. The weekly non-mother’s household income is sig-
nificant at 1% level, and has a positive sign as expected. In fact, a ten peso
increase in non-labor weekly income increases child care time use by 0.12%.
This is consistent with the hypothesis that as the household income increases,
the mother is less likely to work outside the home and will spend more time
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Table 3.3: Child Care Time Use and Expenditures: Whole Sample
Variables Time Use Expenditures
(A) (B)
Mother’s age -0.839∗∗ 0.0003
(0.295) (0.009)
Mother’s age squared 0.008∗ 0.00002
(0.003) (0.0001)
Mother’s years of schooling -0.109 0.035∗∗
(0.115) (0.003)
Urban indicator -0.642 0.077∗
(1.029) (0.031)
Youngest child age 0-4 24.645∗∗ 0.231∗∗
(1.978) (0.059)
Youngest child age 5-6 13.424∗∗ 0.188∗∗
(2.044) (0.060)
Youngest child age 7-12 6.292∗∗ 0.173∗∗
(1.492) (0.045)
Number of children age 0-11 0.124 0.047∗∗
(0.513) (0.015)
Number of children age 12-17 -1.002† 0.071∗∗
(0.552) (0.016)
Non-mother’s log-weekly income 1.289∗∗ 0.146∗∗
(0.488) (0.015)
Intercept 21.488∗∗ -1.029∗∗
(7.108) (0.213)
State dummies Yes Yes
R2 0.293 0.210
N 2696 2696
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Column A: Corresponds to the mother’s weekly child care time use equation
estimated by OLS. Column B: Corresponds to the household’s weekly child
care expenditures equation estimated by OLS.
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taking care of their children.
In Table 3.3 column B you will find the estimated coefficients for the
household’s weekly child care related expenditures. The variables with statis-
tically significant coefficients are years of schooling, urban indicator, indicators
for the age of the youngest child, number of children less than 12 years old,
number of children between 12 and 17 years old, and the non-mother’s income
of the household. One more year of schooling by the mother increases child
care expenditures in the household, but only by 4 pesos per week. This is most
likely explained by the fact that more educated mothers earn higher salaries.
If market goods related to child care are normal goods, then the household
spends more money on them as income increases. Another possible explana-
tion is that more educated mothers, have higher opportunity cost of time and
substitute time with money in the production of child care. However, the co-
efficient for education in column A is not statistically different from zero. The
urban indicator coefficient is positive and significant, but small in magnitude.
Child care expenditures are 23 pesos per week higher if the age of the
youngest kid is less than 5 years old compared to the case where the youngest
child is 13 years or older. If the youngest kid is five or six years old, or between
7 and 12 years old, the children expenditures are 19 and 17 pesos higher relative
to the case in which the youngest kid is 13 years or older, respectively. The
main reason the expenditures for younger children are higher is because most
of the expenses included in the definition for child care related expenditures
correspond to very young children.
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If the number of children less than 12 years old increases by one, then
expenditures related to children increases by 5 pesos; the coefficient is only
significant, however, at the 10% level. For the variable number of children less
than 18 years old but older than 11, the coefficient is significant at the 1% level,
has positive sign, and is equal to 0.071. This is just as expected, the presence of
children increases household expenditures and of course expenditures related
to children, too.
As the non-mother’s income increases, the child care related expendi-
tures increase also. The coefficient is significant and it implies that a 10 pesos
increase in such income augments child care expenditures around 1.5%. This is
consistent with the perception that child care related market goods are normal
goods, thus, expenses related to children increases when this income increases.
Lastly, the variables related to the age of the mother are not significant in
equation (3.3).
Recall that only 28% of the mothers in my sample participated in the
labor market in the reference week, therefore, it is important to see whether
there are differences between working and non-working mothers regarding time
and money spent in child care. I estimate both the child care time and child
care expenditure equations for working mothers and non-working mothers sep-
arately. The results are in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. A natural starting point is to
test the coefficients between the two tables.6 In general, the coefficients are
6The p-values for corresponding Wald tests using a pooled regression with complete set
of interaction terms are available upon request.
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not significantly different for working and non-working mothers. With respect
to the child care time use, the only two coefficients that are significantly differ-
ent between each other are those corresponding to mother’s education and the
urban indicator. Relative to child care expenditures, only the urban indicator
coefficient is different between the two groups.
The results in Table 3.4 correspond to estimates of equations (3.4)
and (3.5) for working women only. In the case of column A, which refers to
mother’s child care time use equation, the only insignificant coefficients are the
variable relative to the number of children and the non-mother’s log-weekly
income. The effect of mother’s age in the child care time use equation for the
case of working mothers is negative at an increasing rate. However, it is only
significant at 10%.
The variable years of schooling is significant at 5% level. The sign
of the coefficient is positive, in contrast to the results for the whole sample.
Working women increase the time dedicated to child care as they increase
their years of schooling. The positive sign is explained by the hypothesis that
more educated mothers are both more productive in the labor market and
in home production, including child care. Then, mothers do not reduce the
time dedicated to children as they increase their years of schooling. Working
mothers in urban areas spend almost four hours less to child care than working
mothers in rural areas.
With respect to the indicators for the age of the youngest child, the
comparison group is again the indicator when the youngest child is 13 years
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Table 3.4: Child Care Time Use and Expenditures: Only Working Mothers
Variables Time Use Expenditures
(A) (B)
Mother’s age -1.080† 0.0007
(0.596) (0.027)
Mother’s age squared 0.012† 0.000001
(0.007) (0.0003)
Mother’s years of schooling 0.352 0.031∗∗
(0.166) (0.007)
Urban indicator -3.708† 0.195∗
(1.919) (0.087)
Youngest child age 0-4 20.694∗∗ 0.308∗
(3.042) (0.139)
Youngest child age 5-6 13.192∗∗ 0.176
(3.058) (0.139)
Youngest child age 7-12 5.179∗ 0.227∗
(2.304) (0.105)
Number of children age 0-11 0.344 0.0096∗
(0.966) (0.044)
Number of children age 12-17 -0.367 -0.053
(0.923) (0.042)
Non-mother’s log-weekly income 0.080 0.182∗∗
(0.705) (0.032)
Intercept 34.839∗∗ -0.875
(13.339) (0.608)
State dummies Yes Yes
R2 0.308 0.283
N 769 769
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Column A: Corresponds to the mother’s weekly child care time use equation
estimated by OLS. Column B: Corresponds to the household’s weekly child
care expenditures equation estimated by OLS.
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or older. As before, mothers dedicate more time to children when they are
younger. If the youngest child is young enough so that he or she is not required
to go to school (less than 4 years old), the mother dedicates 21 hours per week
to take care of children. If the child is either 5 or 6 years old, that is, he or
she is required to attend pre-primary school, then the mother dedicates 13
hours per week to child care. The last indicator for the age of the youngest
child is significant at 5% level. It is positive and smaller than the other two
coefficients, indication that children in primary school age require less time
than younger children.
For working women, household income excluding her own income is
not significant, but the sign is positive as expected. Increases in income that
has nothing to do with how many hours the mother works increases the hours
dedicated to children. The other not significant variables are the two related
to number of children.
In column B of Table 3.4 are the results relative to child care expen-
ditures for working mothers only. The effect of years of schooling in child
care expenditures for working mothers is positive and significant at 1% level.
That is, mothers who work spend three more pesos in child care when years
of schooling increase by one. The urban indicator is positive and statistically
different from zero at the 1% level. That is, working mothers in urban areas
spend 20 more pesos per week than working mothers in rural areas. With
respect to the indicators for the age of the youngest child, working mothers
also spend more money the younger the child.
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Relative to the number of children less than 12 years old, the coefficient
is positive and significant at 5% level. It means that child care expenditures
increase in 10 peso when there is one more children less than 12 years old at
home. The coefficient that corresponds to the number of children age 12 to
17 is also positive, but not significant. Finally, the measure of income without
including mother’s income is again positive and significant: an increase of 10
peso in non-mother’s labor income increments child care expenditures by 1.8%.
This is just as expected if child care related expenditures are normal goods.
In Table 3.5 I estimate the same OLS regressions as before, but restrict
the sample to non-working mothers. With respect to child care time use
(column A) age is decreasing at an increasing rate. If the mother is 35 years
old, the child care time use per week decreases by 50 minutes. Again, this
is probably related to the fact that older mothers have older children, and
mothers spend less and less time with children as they get older.
It is the case that years of schooling has negative sign and it is significant
at 10% level. That is, mothers who do not work spend less time in child care
as they become more educated. For these mothers their opportunity cost of
time is still high enough to not participate in the labor market currently, one
more year of schooling increases the probability of participating in the labor
market, which would make mothers spend less time in child care.
For non-working women, the non-mother’s weekly income is equivalent
to the household income. Therefore, the coefficient indicates that as income in
the household increases, mothers also spend more time with their children. The
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Table 3.5: Child Care Time Use and Expenditures: Only Non-Working Moth-
ers
Variables Time Use Expenditures
(A) (B)
Mother’s age -0.576† -0.011
(0.349) (0.008)
Mother’s age squared 0.005 0.0002†
(0.004) (0.0001)
Mother’s years of schooling -0.265† 0.022∗∗
(0.158) (0.003)
Urban indicator 0.505 0.128
(1.255) (0.028)
Youngest child age 0-4 26.187∗∗ 0.177∗∗
(2.543) (0.057)
Youngest child age 5-6 13.477∗∗ 0.131∗
(2.603) (0.058)
Youngest child age 7-12 6.449∗∗ 0.116∗∗
(1.929) (0.043)
Number of children age 0-11 -0.016 0.048∗∗
(0.614) (0.014)
Number of children age 12-17 -1.219† 0.085∗∗
(0.687) (0.015)
Non-mother’s log-weekly income 1.702∗∗ 0.159∗∗
(0.661) (0.015)
Intercept 13.095 -1.870∗∗
(8.688) (0.195)
State dummies Yes Yes
R2 0.295 0.198
N 1927 1927
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Column A: Corresponds to the mother’s weekly child care time use equation
estimated by OLS. Column B: Corresponds to the household’s weekly child
care expenditures equation estimated by OLS.
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result indicates that a ten peso increase in household income increases child
care time use by 0.26%. Although the coefficient is greater for non-working
mothers than for working mothers, the two coefficients are not significantly
different from each other.
Just as in all previous results, the indicators for the age of the youngest
child are positive, statistically significant, and the magnitude of the coefficient
is smaller the older the youngest child. Comparing these coefficients with the
corresponding ones for working mothers, it is the case that the coefficients are
very similar in magnitude.7 Even though working mothers have presumably
less time to dedicate to children than non-working mothers, both groups in-
crease child care time about the same number of hours according to the age
of the youngest child.
Relative to child care related expenditures for non-working mothers,
column B of Table 3.5, education is positive and significant. This implies
that more educated non-working mothers spend more money in their children,
although the coefficient is very small: one more year of schooling increases ex-
penditures related to children by two pesos per week. Since these mothers are
not labor force participants, the fact that they spend more money in children
expenditures is related to the view that more educated mothers care more for
their children and therefore spend significantly more monetary resources on
them. With respect to the age of children, if the youngest child is less than
7In fact, they are not significantly different between each other.
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5 years old, then non-working mothers spend 17 pesos per week more than
mothers whose youngest child is 13 years or older. The coefficient is signifi-
cant at 1% level. If the youngest child is either 5 or 6 years old, non-working
mothers spend 13 pesos in child care than the comparison group. For the last
category, child care expenditures increase in 12 peso and the coefficient is also
significant at 1%. In comparison, in families where the mother participates
in the labor market, the coefficients in the child care expenditures equation
for the indicators of the age of the youngest child are much bigger than for
non-working mothers.
It is also the case that non-working mothers spend more money on
children as their non-labor income increases. The coefficient is in fact sig-
nificant at 1% level. A 10 peso increase in such income augments child care
expenditures by 1.6%. When comparing this effect to the corresponding effect
for working mothers, it turns out that working mothers spend more money
than non-working mothers as the non-mother’s log-weekly income increases.
However, the coefficients are not statistically different between each other.
Around 33% of the sample reported zero child care time use by mothers
during the week of reference. Also, 19% reported zero expenditures related to
children in the week of reference. Therefore, a Tobit model is more appropriate
for equations (3.4) and (3.5). The resulting estimates are very similar to the
ones reported here. The corresponding tables are available upon request.
In summary, more educated mothers spend more money in child related
expenditures.With respect to child care time use, working mothers spend more
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time with their children as their years of schooling increase. For non-working
mothers, the effect is the opposite: more educated mothers spend less time with
their children. As the household income without including mother’s income
increases, both time and expenditures dedicated to children increase. The only
case the coefficient is not significant is in the case of the working mothers’ child
care time use equation. Regardless of whether women work or not, the age of
the youngest child is very important in determining both time and monetary
expenses related to child care.
3.4.1.1 Income Expansion Paths
Given that 71% of my sample of mothers do not participate in the labor
market, non-mother’s log-weekly income is a very important determinant of
both child care time and money expenditures. It is interesting to see how
time and money spent in child care varies as the household income without
counting mother’s income changes. Using the estimated equation from Tables
3.4 and 3.5 in Figure 3.1, I graph the predicted ratio of pesos over hours spent
in child care per week at each possible level of non-mother’s weekly household
income both for working and non-working mothers.
The graphs indicate that for all levels of income, working mothers spend
more money relative to time in child care. For example, if the non-mother’s
income is 2000 pesos per week, working mothers spent on average 3.5 times
more money than hours in child care. For non-working mothers the ratio is
equal to two if the household income is 2000 pesos per week.
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Figure 3.1: Income Expansion Paths
According to the graph, the ratio of monetary expenditures over time
expenditures increases as income increases but at an logarithmic rate. The
income expansion path for non-working women is flatter than the correspond-
ing path for working women. That is, at higher levels of household income,
non-working mothers spend more time than money in child care than working
mothers. This is just as expected because working mothers have less time to
spend with their children than non-working mothers.
3.4.2 Tobit Selection Equation with Missing Explanatory Variable
Although the reduced form model results are very informative and use-
ful as a first approximation to the data, one would like to estimate the system
of equations (3.1)-(3.3) directly. In particular, I am interested in estimating
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the effect of the mother’s wage rate on the mother’s child care time use and
household’s expenditures in child care.
The problem is that wages are not observed for the entire sample. These
women, one would expect, self-select into the labor force; in other words,
only women with offered wage rates greater than their reservation wages will
participate in the labor market.
In order to get consistent and
√
N -asymptotically normal estimates
of the coefficients on equations (3.1)-(3.3), I use the econometric procedure
described by Wooldridge (2002) in Section 17.5.2. The idea is to estimate
a system of four equations. The first two are the structural equations of
interest: equations (3.2) and (3.3). The third equation is a linear projection of
the missing variable, which here corresponds to equation (3.1), and the fourth
equation is the Tobit selection equation. In this case, this is the mother’s labor
supply equation.
First, I estimate the reduced form equation for the labor supply decision
using a Tobit model for all observations. I then obtain the Tobit residuals for
the selected sub-sample, that is only those women who participated in the
labor force. The second step is to estimate the linear projection of the log-
wage on all exogenous variables and the corresponding Tobit residuals for
the selected sub-sample. Third, I estimate equations (3.2) and (3.3) by OLS
with the predicted log-wage and the Tobit residuals as regressors, with years of
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schooling as the exclusion restriction, and using only the selected sub-sample.8
To identify the effects of wages on time and goods expenditures, I exclude the
mother’s education from equations (3.2) and (3.3).
The coefficients for the reduced form labor supply using a Tobit model,
the first step of this procedure, are in Table 3.6. Just as expected, the older the
mother, the more hours she devotes to the labor market but at a decreasing
rate. Mother’s age effect reaches its maximum at 40 years. The mother’s years
of schooling is positive and significant. This is in accordance to the hypothesis
that more educated women earn higher wages because their productivity in
the labor market is higher, therefore they work more. The urban indicator is
marginally significant and has positive sign. This implies that women living
in urban areas work more hours in the labor market. In contrast to all previ-
ous results, the indicators for age of the youngest child are not significant in
this case. It is well known that the presence of young children is expected to
increase the reservation wage, lowering the probability of labor force partici-
pation; however I do not observe this effect in this table. This implies that
Mexican mothers stay out of the labor market not because they have little
children to take care of, but because perhaps their levels of schooling and
experience do not permit them to participate in the labor market.
Notice that the coefficient for the youngest child being less than 5 years
8Usually the sample selection equation and the structural equation are the same. In such
cases, the whole sample is used to estimate the equation of interest. In my paper this is
not the case. Hence, to correctly estimate the structural equation I need to focus on the
selected sub-sample for which the Tobit residuals are calculated.
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Table 3.6: First Step: Tobit Selection Equation
Variables Coefficient
Mother’s age 6.242∗∗
(0.914)
Mother’s age squared -0.077∗∗
(0.011)
Mother’s years of schooling 2.747∗∗
(0.310)
Urban indicator 17.531∗∗
(3.044)
Youngest child age 0-4 -6.436
(5.394)
Youngest child age 5-6 2.208
(5.404)
Youngest child age 7-12 -1.419
(4.021)
Number of children age 0-11 -5.741∗∗
(1.527)
Number of children age 12-17 -0.546
(1.531)
Non-mother’s log-weekly income -11.130∗∗
(1.324)
Intercept -78.703∗∗
(21.126)
State dummies Yes
Log-likelihood -4855.903
N 2696
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
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old indicator has negative sign and it is significant at 5% level. When children
are very young and especially if they don’t go to school yet, mothers dedicate
less time to the labor market. This result is consistent with the negative and
significant coefficient for the number of children less than 12 years old. One
more child in age group decreases the hours dedicated to the labor market by
mothers. With respect to the measure of income other than mother’s income,
the coefficient is negative and significant at 1% level. This is consistent with
the idea that the reservation wage rises as non-labor income increases, making
the mother less likely to participate in the labor market.
Table 3.7 shows the results for the linear projection of the log-wage on
all exogenous variables and the Tobit residuals for the selected sub-sample.
The variables that are statistically significant in this case are the variables re-
lated to age, mother’s years of schooling, the non-mother’s log-weekly income,
and the residual. The effect of the mother’s age in the log-wage equation is
negative at an increasing rate. The linear effect is significant at 10% level,
whereas the quadratic term is significant at 5% level. The mother’s years of
schooling coefficient implies that one more year of education increases the wage
rate by 4%. The coefficient is significant at 1% level. When the non-mother’s
log weekly income increases by 10 peso, the mother’s wage rate increases by
2.58%. This coefficient is significant at 1% level. The most important result
here is that the coefficient for the Tobit residual coefficient is significant. Al-
though the coefficient is negative, contrary to what I expected, it is very small.
This means that the unobserved characteristics that motivate mothers to work
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Table 3.7: Second Step: Log-wage Equation
Variables Coefficient
Mother’s age -0.063†
(0.033)
Mother’s age squared 0.0001∗
(0.0004)
Mother’s years of schooling 0.041∗∗
(0.011)
Urban indicator -0.150
(0.118)
Youngest child age 0-4 0.106
(0.194)
Youngest child age 5-6 0.042
(0.172)
Youngest child age 7-12 -0.123
(0.139)
Number of children age 0-11 0.076
(0.060)
Number of children age 12-17 -0.016
(0.056)
Non-mother’s log-weekly income 0.258∗∗
(0.049)
Residual -0.020∗∗
(0.002)
Intercept 3.644∗∗
(0.776)
State dummies Yes
R2 0.387
N 769
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 3.8: Third Step: Structural Child Care Time Use and Expenditures
Variables Time Use Expenditures
(A) (B)
Predicted mother’s log-wage rate 4.362 0.932†
(4.991) (0.520)
Mother’s age -1.139 0.065
(0.742) (0.057)
Mother’s age squared 0.012 -0.001
(0.009) (0.0007)
Mother years of schooling - -
- -
Urban indicator -3.571† 0.356∗
(2.060) (0.160)
Youngest child age 0-4 20.774∗∗ 0.187
(3.245) (0.265)
Youngest child age 5-6 13.017∗∗ 0.136
(3.146) (0.220)
Youngest child age 7-12 6.067∗ 0.328†
(2.383) (0.184)
Number of children age 0-11 0.192 0.018
(1.058) (0.094)
Number of children age 12-17 -0.304 0.068
(0.961) (0.075)
Non-mother’s log-weekly income -0.304 -0.083
(0.961) (0.197)
Residuals 0.025 0.021
(0.129) (0.013)
Intercept 25.007 -4.513∗
(23.551) (2.085)
State dummies Yes Yes
R2 0.275 -
N 769 769
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Column A: Corresponds to the mother’s weekly child care time use equation
estimated by OLS. Column B: Corresponds to the household’s weekly child
care expenditures equation estimated by OLS.
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in the labor market decrease their wage rate.
The results for the third step of the procedure are in Table 3.8, that
is, OLS estimates for the child care time use and expenditures using only
the selected sub-sample and including the predicted mother’s log-wage rate
as an explanatory variable.9 The identification strategy consists in excluding
the years of schooling variable from the child care time use and expenditures
equations, but including it in the log-wage linear prediction. Also, the Tobit
residuals are included in both equations. Many regressors are not statistically
significant. In the case of child care time use the indicators for the age of the
youngest child are positive and significant. These contrast with the results for
child care expenditures where only one indicator for the age of the youngest
child is significant and at 10% level. In both cases, the coefficients are just as
expected in terms of magnitude and sign. The urban indicator is significant
in both columns, however the sign is negative in the time use equation and
positive in the expenditure equation. They imply that mothers in urban areas
spend less time and more monetary resources in child care than mother in rural
areas. With respect to the predicted mother’s log wage rate, the coefficient is
positive and significant at 10% level. In the child care expenditures equation, a
one peso increase in the wage rate increases child care expenditures by 0.93%.
In the child care time use equation this variable is not significant and has
positive sign.
9The standard errors in the log-wage and child care expenditure equation were corrected
using bootstrap methods because the residuals were significant in both cases.
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A natural fourth step would be to estimate the labor supply equation
with the predicted wage as regressor. Following Wooldridge (2002), the cor-
rect way to do this is by estimating a Tobit model for hours of work where
the predicted log-wage rate is included as regressor and years of schooling is
excluded as the exclusion restriction. Such model is estimated using the whole
sample. The results are just as expected, but the corrected standard errors
are big for all variables. The results are available upon request.
3.5 Conclusions and Future Work
The main contribution of this paper is that it analyzes child care time
use and child care expenditures simultaneously. This is possible because the
2002 Mexican time use survey is a sub-sample of the Mexican household sur-
vey which contains detailed information about household expenditures. The
main results are the following. The age of the youngest child is the most im-
portant determinant of both child care time and money expenditures. It is the
case that more educated mothers spend more money on their children: three
and two pesos per week as years of schooling increases in one unit for work-
ing and non-working mothers respectively. With respect to child care time
use, the results differ between the two groups. Working mothers increase the
time they dedicate to children as they become more educated. In contrast,
non-working mothers decrease the time they dedicate to children as they in-
crease their years of schooling. At all levels of non-mother’s income, working
mothers spend significantly more money relative to time in child care than
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non-working mothers. For both groups the ratio of money over time increases
at a decreasing rate; however, for non-working mothers the income expansion
path is much flatter.
As a future extension to this paper, I will include the husband’s child
care time use and labor supply into the analysis. This can be easily incorpo-
rated because different uses of time are observed in the data and, in contrast
to women, the wage rate is always observed for men in this sample. By doing
this I can see the differences in changes of the opportunity cost of time for
each spouse in labor supply, but more importantly in child care related time
use for both husband and wife, and in child care related monetary expendi-
tures. Another possible extension is to include other uses of time that are also
available in the data set. For example, I can incorporate housework time and
time dedicated to leisure activities.
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Appendix 1
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Household Utility Maximization Problem
A.1.1 Step One
Given Z¯j, qj, and w,
min
Xj ,Tj
qjXj + wTj such that Z¯j =
(
X
θj
j + T
θj
j
) 1
θj .
The lagrangian is:
L = qjXj + wTj + ηj
(
Z¯j −
(
X
θj
j + T
θj
j
) 1
θj
)
.
Differentiate with respect to Xj, and Tj, we get first-order conditions:
qj = ηj
(
1
θj
(
X
θj
j + T
θj
j
) 1
θj
−1)
θjX
θj−1
j , w = ηj
(
1
θj
(
X
θj
j + T
θj
j
) 1
θj
−1)
θjT
θj−1
j .
Using the first-order conditions, we can get
Xj
Tj
=
(
w
qj
) 1
1−θj
. (1.1)
From the home production function
(
Z¯j =
(
X
θj
j + T
θj
j
) 1
θj
)
and equation (1.1),
we have:
Xj = αjZ¯j (1.2)
Tj = βjZ¯j (1.3)
where αj ≡
(
1 +
(pj+sj
w
)− θj
θj−1
)− 1
θj
, βj ≡
(
1 +
(pj+sj
w
) θj
θj−1
)− 1
θj
.
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A.1.2 Step Two
max
Z0,Z1,··· ,Zn
U (Z0, Z1, · · · , Zn)
such that q1X1 + ...+ qnXn = w (T − T1 − ...− Tn − T0) +M
We can rewrite the budget constraint by using (1.2) and (1.3).
q1X1 + ...+ qnXn = w (T − T1 − ...− Tn − T0) +M
γ0Z0 + γ1Z1 + ...+ γnZn = wT +M
where γj =
{
w
qjαj + wβj
j = 0
j = 1, .., n
So the maximization problem is:
max
Z0,Z1,··· ,Zn
U (Z0, Z1, · · · , Zn) such that γ0Z0 + γ1Z1 + ...+ γnZn = wT +M.
Then solutions are Uj = λγj for j = 0, 1, .., n where λ is the lagrangian multiplier.
A.2 Optimal Government Policy Problem
A.2.1 Optimal Government Policy Problem
The Government problem is
max
s1,...,sn
V (q0, q1, · · · , qn, w) such that s1X1 + · · ·+ snXn = R¯.
The lagrangian is:
L = V (q0, q1, · · · , qn, w) + µ (s1X1 + · · ·+ snXn −R)
where µ is the lagrangian multiplier. Differentiate the Lagrangian with respect to
s1, ..., sn. we get:
dL
dsk
=
∂V
∂qk
dqk
dsk
+ µ
Xk + n∑
j=1
sj
∂Xj
∂qk
dqk
dsk
 = 0 for k = 1, ..., n.
Using dqk/dsk = 1, we get
λ
(
1
αk
Xk
)
∂γk
∂qk
= µ
Xk + n∑
j=1
sj
∂Xj
∂qk

λ
(
1
αk
∂γk
∂qk
)
− µ
µ
=
n∑
j=1
sj
Xk
∂Xj
∂qk
.
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Then using ∂γk/∂qk= αk, we have
λ− µ
µ
=
n∑
j=1
sj
Xk
∂Xj
∂qk
. (1.4)
With the property of slutsky equation and slutsky symmetry, equation (1.4) becomes
λ− µ
µ
+
n∑
j=1
sj
∂Xj
∂M
=
n∑
j=1
sj
Xk
∂Xck
∂qj
. (1.5)
And the left hand side of equation (1.5) does not depend on k. So let −Θ ≡ λ−µµ +∑n
j=1 sj
∂Xj
∂M , then equation (1.5) is:
−Φ =
n∑
j=1
sj
qj
εcki where ε
c
ki ≡
qj
Xk
∂Xck
∂qj
(1.6)
A.2.2 Three-commodity Economy
To derive the property of compensated elasticity, we differentiate U¯ =
U (T0, X1, T1, X2, T2) with respect to q1. Then by using the envelope theorem
and slutsky symmetry, we derive
0 = UT0
∂T c0
∂q1
+ UX1
∂Xc1
∂q1
+ UT1
∂T c1
∂q1
+ UX2
∂Xc2
∂q1
+ UT2
∂T c2
∂q1
= λw
∂T c0
∂q1
+ λq1
∂Xc1
∂q1
+ λw
∂T c1
∂q1
+ λq2
∂Xc2
∂q1
+ λw
∂T c2
∂q1
=
w
X1
∂Xc1
∂w
+
q1
X1
∂Xc1
∂q1
+
w
X1
∂Xc1
∂w
+
q2
X1
∂Xc1
∂q2
+
w
X1
∂Xc1
∂w
= εc11 + ε
c
12 + 3ε
c
10.
Using u (Z0, Z1, Z2) = δ0 lnZ0 + δ1 lnZ1 + δ2 lnZ2, let’s calculate compensated
demand.
min γ0Z0 + γ1Z1 + γ2Z2 s.t U¯ = δ0 lnZ0 + δ1 lnZ1 + δ2 lnZ2
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Then we can obtain the following compensated demand function for X1 and X2:
Xc1 = α1U¯
(
δ1
δ0
γ1
γ0
)δ0 (δ1
δ2
γ2
γ1
)δ2
, Xc2 = α2U¯
(
δ1
δ0
γ1
γ0
)δ0 (δ1
δ2
γ2
γ1
)δ2−1
where αj ≡
(
1 +
( qj
w
)− θj
θj−1
)− 1
θj
for j = 1, 2. Then
w
Xc1
dXc1
dw
=
w
α1
dα1
dw
− δ0 w
γ0
dγ0
dw
+ (δ0 − δ2) w
γ1
dγ1
dw
+ δ2
w
γ2
dγ2
dw
(1.7)
w
Xc2
dXc2
dw
=
w
α2
dα2
dw
+ δ0
w
γ1
dγ1
dw
− δ0 w
γ0
dγ0
dw
+ (δ2 − 1) w
γ2
dγ2
dw
(1.8)
− (δ2 − 1) w
γ1
dγ1
dw
From equation (1.7) and (1.8) ,
w
Xc2
dXc2
dw
− w
Xc1
dXc1
dw
=
(
w
α2
dα2
dw
− w
γ2
dγ2
dw
)
−
(
w
α1
dα1
dw
− w
γ1
dγ1
dw
)
=
θ2
1−θ2
1 +
(
w
q2
) θ2
1−θ2
−
θ1
1−θ1
1 +
(
w
q1
) θ1
1−θ1
This does not immediately translate into σ1 < σ2 → εc10 < εc20. However this
result always holds if the price of the necessity (q1) is lower than the price
of the luxury (q2). Even if the price of the necessity is higher than the price
of the luxury, the result holds as long as the elasticity of substitution of Z2
is sufficiently larger than that of Z1. Conventional wisdom contends that a
necessity tends to have a lower elasticity of substitution than a luxury. As
shown empirically in Section 1.4, the elasticity of substitution for a necessity
is significantly lower than that of a luxury.
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A.3 Policy Implication
A.3.1 The Solution to The Household Maximization Problem
X∗j = αj
δj
γj
(wT +M) , T ∗j = βj
δj
γj
(wT +M)
where αj ≡
(
1 +
( qj
w
)− θj
θj−1
)− 1
θj
, βj ≡
(
1 +
( qj
w
) θj
θj−1
)− 1
θj
and γj =
{
w if i = 0
qjαj + wβj if i = 1, 2.
A.3.2 Six Equations and Six Unknown Parameters
We solved 6 equations simultaneously to get values of 6 unknown pa-
rameters. The six unknown parameters are p1, p2, δ0, δ1, δ2,M , and the six
equations are: T ∗0 = 0.389, T
∗
1 = 0.178, T
∗
2 = 0.184,
p1X∗1
p2X∗2
= 0.838
(
= 389.77
465.29
)
,
∑2
i=0 δi = 1,
∑2
i=1 qiX
∗
i = w
(
T −∑2i=1 T ∗i )+M .
Solving the system, we get p1 = 0.2493, p2 = 0.4489, δ0 = 0.1962, δ1 = 0.3103,
δ2 = 0.4936, and M = 0.9797.
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